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Before a criminal trial begins, the state must defend its right
to use almost every piece of evidence and even to commence pro-
ceedings. Was the defendant properly questioned? Was the evi-
dence properly seized? Did the victim make a valid identifica-
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tion? Can the case be retried? Ever since 1961, pre-trial litigation
of these questions has often determined trial result.
This article is presented in four parts, synopsizing the current
state of the law in Pennsylvania on the issues of confessions, search
and seizure, identifications and double jeopardy. This review is
not intended to detail the answers but only to allow a general un-




Prior to 1964, the principal test for the admissibility of a de-
fendant's statement was whether it was "voluntary". A confession
was inadmissible then only if it was "coerced"-not the product of a
rational intellect or a free will but rather the result of overbearing.'
Voluntariness was determined by the "totality of the circumstan-
ces.'
2
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois3
held that a confession taken from a suspect when the investiga-
tion had "focused" on him as the accused was inadmissible if (1)
he requests an attorney and is denied an opportunity to consult
with one or (2) he is not warned of his right to remain silent.
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court extended
Escobedo in Miranda v. Arizona.4 Generally Miranda holds that,
unless certain specified procedures are followed, statements by a
defendant must be excluded regardless of the fact that the state-
ments might have been voluntary under prior standards.5
1. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
2. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel.
Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A.2d 628 (1966).
3. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Neither Escobedo nor Miranda are applicable to cases in which
the trial was commenced prior to those decisions. Thus for trials prior
to June 22, 1964, the old "voluntariness standards" are applicable. For
trials between June 22, 1964, and June 13, 1966, Escobedo standards are
applicable. For trials after June 13, 1966, Miranda standards are applica-
ble. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Miranda and Escobedo
are also inapplicable to retrials when the original trial commenced prior
to those decisions. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969).
The test of "voluntariness" is the proper standard for pre-Miranda and
Escobedo cases. In considering the "totality of the circumstances," one
factor is the lack of Miranda warnings. It is one factor, among others,
to be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a pre-Miranda or pre-
Escobedo statement. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968); Davis v.
North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
Specifically, the Miranda holding can be detailed as follows:
Scope:
The prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial inter-
rogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in any significant way.0
Warnings:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
(1) that he has a right to remain silent, (2) that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and (3) that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.
7
Waiver:
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rightsproviT.de-d t.he waiver iss made vuna.ri y, knnigy
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no question-
ing. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some state-
ments on his own does not deprive him of the right to re-
frain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
8
II. REQUIREMENT OF WARNINGS
A. Custody
Miranda requires warnings and a waiver when there is "custo-
dial interrogation"-"after a person has been taken into custody or
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Several courts have held that Johnson v. New Jersey means Miranda
standards apply only to post-Miranda statements rather than post-Mir-
anda trials. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that
Johnson holds that Miranda applies to trials commenced after the date
of Miranda regardless of the time of the statement. Commonwealth v.
Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971). Certiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court on April 24, 1972. Pennsylvania v. Ware, 405 U.S.
987 (1972). See also, Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d
353 (1973).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
7. Id. at 444.
8. Id. at 444-45.
9. In a footnote, the Supreme Court stated that "custody" and "de-
prived of freedom of action" is "what we meant in Escobedo when we
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966). In Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola,
448 Pa. 54, 292 A.2d 333 (1972), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that warnings are required under Miranda when an individual is in custody
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What constitutes custodial interrogation must be approached
on a case by case basis.10 The circumstances to be weighed include
the information possessed by the police and their actions. In the
absence of a formal arrest, something must be said or done by the
authorities which indicates that they would not have allowed a
defendant to depart." If the police questioning occurs in an atmo-
sphere or under circumstances which leave the individual no free-
dom of choice and which are inherently coercive, there is "custodial
interrogation.""
The test is an objective one. Custody occurs when a suspect
is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or
restricted of his freedom of action under official authority.'" Cus-
tody does not depend on the subjective intent of the police but
rather whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of
action or is placed in a situation in which he could reasonably be-
lieve that his freedom of action or movement is restricted. As
the test is an objective one, and not what is in the mind of the po-
lice officer, police attempts to inform a person of his rights do
not convert an otherwise non-custodial situation into a custodial
one. The mere giving of abbreviated warnings does not per se indi-
cate custody and thus a need for any warnings at all.
1 4
Custodial interrogation is not limited to police station ques-
tioning or questioning after formal arrest."' The factors to be con-
sidered are the place, time, sequence, scope and circumstances of
the interview.
Place-Generally, even innocent questions asked in an inher-
ently coercive atmosphere of a police station create an objective
impression of deprivation of freedom of action and thus require
warnings.16 However, police station interviews are not per se cus-
or is the focus of an investigation. DiNicuola involved a hospitalized de-
fendant, not really free to leave or to eject the police.
10. United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1970).
11. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 452 Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973). It
is immaterial that if the person had attempted to flee, thereby furnishing
additional evidence of guilt, the officers would have restrained him.
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969).
12. Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 59, 239 A.2d 416 (1968).
13. Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971).
14. United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970). See Com-
monwealth v. Ross, 452 Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973).
15. Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
16. Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 439 Pa. 34, 264 A.2d 706 (1970). See Proctor
v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Horn-
berger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1973).
todial.17 Whether or not an individual in fact voluntarily goes to
the station, can leave at any time, and thus is not in custody, often
depends on whether he is a suspect with the investigation focused
on him.'8 Similarly, if one is in jail, he is in custody for the pur-
poses of any interrogation, whether related to the offense for
which he is incarcerated or not. 19
On the other end, questioning at the private home of a suspect
or friend of the suspect is not custodial, 20 unless an investigation is
focused or other indicia of arrest are apparent.21 . Similarly, rou-
tine, on-the-scene questioning is not considered custodial.
2 2 It is
an essential police tool to resolve problems by immediate investiga-
tion." Police may question by-standers, including even a suspect,
at the scene of an offense, as to the facts of the offense.
24 The issue
is closely tied to focus and voluntariness. Routine questioning is
proper. Detailed extensive investigation is not.
2 5
17. For example, if an individual voluntarily goes to the police station
and answers questions, as a witness, the interview process is often consid-
ered non-custodial. See Clark v. United States, 400 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968);
People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969).
18. See United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Bird,
293 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Mont. 1968); United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp.
660 (S.D.NY. 1967).
19. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); see Commonwealth
v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969). Questioning of a defendant
in a hospital, where he is not really free to leave or to eject the police,
is similar to "official detention" and would indicate custody. Common-
wealth v. D'Nicoula, 448 Pa. 54, 292 A.2d 333 (1972).
20. Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969); Common-
wealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216 (1966); Commonwealth v.
Barclay, 212 Pa. Super. 25, 240 A.2d 838 (1968). See also Commonwealth
v. Ross, 452 Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973).
21. Physical restraint is a significant factor in determining whether
a person is in custody. The fact that he is in handcuffs leads to a logical
conclusion of custody and thus the need for warnings. Commonwealth
v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A.2d 409 (1968). Other factors include persistent
questioning, large numbers of police, and police control of the situation.
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d
8 (9th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
22. As stated in Miranda, "General on the scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the
fact finding process is not affected by [Miranda requirements] .... In
such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in cus-
tody interrogation is not necessarily present." 384 U.S. 436, 447-78.
23. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292 A.2d 352 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Freeman, 438 Pa. 1, 263 A.2d 403 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968). See Lowe v. United States,
407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969).
24. Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 392 U.S. 647 (1968). See Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d
476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967).
25. United States v. Cobb, 449 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. McKinnon, 443 Pa. 183, 278 A.2d 878 (1971). Similarly, informa-
tional questioning of a defendant, prior to actual formal arrest, may be
admissible without warnings. Arrest and extensive detention and ques-
tioning at the scene is not. See Allen v. United States, 404 F.2d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
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Included within the on-scene questioning exception is the traf-
fic stop situation. Generally, the questioning of a driver of a
stopped car is not considered custodial.2 6 Similarly, incidental de-
tention to check a stolen car registration does not amount to cus-
tody.27 Such stops are routine, and any incidental questioning as
to cards, identity and papers does not require warnings. 28 Of
course, once an offense, other than a minor traffic violation, is un-
covered, and the defendant is either arrested or restrained, detailed
questioning must be preceded by warnings and a waiver.2 9
Time-Generally questioning in the daylight is more likely to
be considered non-custodial than questioning in the late night or
early evening.
30
Persons Present-Miranda speaks of being "cut off from the
outside world."'31 Thus, the presence of family or friends may be
a significant factor to show that no custody exists. 2 On the other
hand, removal of a defendant from family or friends is a strong in-
dication of custody.1
3
A large number of police compared to civilians may indicate
custody.3 4 And one police officer, among numerous civilians is a
strong indication of no custody.3 5
Nature of Questioning-Short investigative questions such as
"what happened?, who did it?, what are you doing here?" are gener-
ally considered non-custodial.3" Such routine questioning is proper
even during a stop and frisk. Temporary detention under suspi-
26. Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969).
27. Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
28. United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. LeQuire, 424 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Breen,
419 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Montez-Hernandez, 291 F.
Supp. 712 (E.D. Cal. 1968); State v. Stafford, 6 Conn. Cir. 613, 281 A.2d
827 (1971).
29. See Bendelow v. United States, 418 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1969); Agius
v. United States, 413 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
31. 384 U.S. 436, 445.
32. United States v. Owens, 431 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Barclay,
212 Pa. Super. 25, 240 A.2d 838 (1968).
33. Pemberton v. Peyton, 288 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Va. 1968); Common-
wealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
34. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
35. People v. Robinson, 22 Mich. App. 124, 177 N.W.2d 234 (1970).
36. Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969); Allen v.
United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Frazier,
443 Pa. 178, 279 A.2d 33 (1971); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 438 Pa. 1,
263 A.2d 403 (1970); Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d
612 (1968). But questions such as "What did you stab her with?" in-
dicate focus and require warnings and a waiver. Commonwealth v. Brit-
tain, Pa. , A.2d (1974).
cious circumstances does not indicate custody 7
B. Interrogator
Generally, a suspect who makes damaging admissions in re-
sponse to citizen interrogation need not be warned. Miranda itself
speaks only of "questioning by law enforcement officers."' 8 Who
is or is not a law enforcement officer depends on the facts of the sit-
uation. Clearly a private citizen, acting without police authority or
control, is not one.3 9 On the other hand, if police use a private citi-
zen as their agent, this is "police questioning," requiring warn-
ings.
40
Official government agents acting in their official capacity must
give warnings. 41 Semi-official agents, such as railroad detectives,
bank guards, and foreign police officers do not need to warn.
42 Of
course, if such agents have local police authority and are thus, in
fact, "police," Miranda warnings are required.
a policeman, he can hardly be said to believe he is in "custody."
Thus, unsolicited discussions with prison guards need not be pre-
ceded or interrupted by warnings.48 Conversations with undercover
agents, whether in the home or even in jail, are voluntary admis-
sions. Misplaced reliance is not coercion.
44
C. "Questioning"-Volunteer and Spontaneous Statements
Miranda states that "volunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not
affected by our holding."4 5 A volunteered statement is one that is
not made in response to police questioning. An accused has the
right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the "unfet-
tered exercise of his own free will.'
46
A man who calls or goes to the police and blurts out a state-
ment is not covered by Miranda.4T Similarly, spontaneous state-
37. Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968); People v. Manis, 268 Cal. App.
2d 653, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1969).
38. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
39. Yates v. United States, 384 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
40. United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Bordner,
432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968).
41. Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969).
42. United States v. Birnstih, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1970).
43. Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 307 A.2d 229 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Mozillo, 443 Pa. 171, 278 A.2d 874 (1971).
44. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. Fior-
anti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
45. 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
46. Commonwealth v. Leaming, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); Commonwealth v.
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ments made upon and in response to arrest, without questioning,
are "volunteered."
48
Even after a defendant is in custody, if he blurts out a state-
ment, not in response to police questioning, the lack of warnings is
irrelevant.49 Moreover, the police are permitted to ask certain ad-
ministrative questions, such as age, residence, schooling, or to in-
quire as to whether a defendant wishes to waive his rights, and if
a defendant spontaneously admits his guilt, the statement is "vol-
unteered." 50  Similarly, observations as to a suspect's status are
not questioning and responses may still be considered volunteered.
51
The fact that a suspect has surrendered does not mean an auto-
matic waiver of rights. If he is interrogated, the warnings and a
waiver are required if a subsequent statement is to be admissible.
52
However, even if a defendant initially chooses to remain silent, a
subsequently volunteered statement is admissible-absent trickery
or deception by the police.
53
Confessions must be truly volunteered. A statement resulting
from a pre-arranged confrontation with a co-defendant is not "vol-
unteered." 54 Such a statement is proper only if there are warnings
and a waiver. It is then still in response to a stimulus but after
full and complete knowledge of one's rights.55 Similarly, "adminis-
trative" questioning must be clearly that and not applied to encour-
age or elicit incriminating statements. 6
Ross, 452 Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 438
Pa. 1, 263 A.2d 403 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Vanderpoll v. Russell,
426 Pa. 499, 233 A.2d 246 (1967).
48. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 450 Pa. 273, 299 A.2d 608 (1973) ("I
was going to give myself up in the morning anyhow.").
49. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 450 Pa. 273, 299 A.2d 608 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Mozillo, 443 Pa. 171, 278 A.2d 874 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown,
438 Pa. 52, 265 A.2d 101 (1970). See also, Commonwealth v. Ross, 452
Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973).
50. Compare Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449, 309 A.2d 589 (1973)
(warnings interrupted-volunteered) and Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa.
205, 307 A.2d 229 (1973) (administrative-volunteered) with Common-
wealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973) (not volunteered).
51. Commonwealth v. Brown, 438 Pa. 52, 265 A.2d 101 (1970) ("He's
in bad shape," "You are going to jail."). But inquiries as to evidence or
guilt are considered "questioning." Commonwealth v. Brittain, Pa.
A.2d (1974).
52. Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969).
53. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970).
54. Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179
(1973), with Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922
(1971).
56. Compare Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 307 A.2d 229
(1973), and Commonwealth v. Brittain, Pa. , A.2d (1974).
Once a defendant exercises his Miranda rights, almost any stim-
ulus, if state-induced will negate a finding of a "volunteered" state-
ment.57 A heavy burden is placed on the police to show that state-
statements were blurted out before there was an opportunity to
warn.
58
If a volunteered statement is begun, the police have no obliga-
tion to interrupt and warn.59 However, if merely an indication of a
desire to give a statement is shown, there must be warnings and
a waiver. 60 If a defendant stops his volunteered statement, warnings
and a waiver are required before any questioning in depth.61
III. THE MIRANDA WARNINGS
A. Scope
Standard warnings, which must be given prior to interroga-
tion,62 must caution of the:
1) right to silence;
2) use of statements given by suspect against him in court;
3) right to have lawyer before answering questions and while
being asked questions;
4) right to have lawyer provided free of charge.6 3
The warnings are not a ritual of set words. So long as the
meaning of the rights is adequately conveyed and the message is
clear, it is sufficient.
64
It is proper to warn a defendant that his statement "might",
"may"l, "can", or "could" be used against him. "Will" is not essen-
tial wording.65 However, it is improper to warn a defendant that
57. See Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
58. Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973).
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
60. Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973).
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 297 A.2d 108
(1971).
62. Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970).
63. In Philadelphia, these warnings are found on the standard police
questioning card and Form 75 Misc. 3. They have been repeatedly ap-
proved by the Pennsylvania courts. Commonwealth v. Ponton, 450 Pa.
40, 299 A.2d 634 (1973); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d
361 (1970); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219 Pa. Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685
(1971). The Philadelphia card also indicates a warning that a defendant
has a right to stop giving a statement at any time; such a warning is
not required. People v. Washington, 115 Ill. App. 2d 318, 253 N.E.2d 677
(1971); People v. Smith, 30 Mich. App. 34, 186 N.W.2d 61 (1971); Green v.
State, 451 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1971). See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219 Pa.
Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971).
64. United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); Green v.
United States, 386 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1967); Coyote v. United States,
380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Baker, 214 Pa. Super.
27, 251 A.2d 737 (1969).
65. Davis v. United States, 425 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1970) ("can");
United States v. Grady, 423 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1970) ("can"); United
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a settlement might be used "for or against him."66 Such a deficiency
undercuts "clear conveyance of the negative impact at trial of a
statement."' 7
Defendants must be told in sufficiently clear language of their
right to counsel, free of charge, before answering any questions.
The issue is solely whether a defendant was aware of his right to
free counsel." Merely telling him that he has a right to an attorney
and that the police would get one for him does not convey the
right to free counsel in his own behalf and for his own represen-
tation. 9 Telling him that a lawyer will be appointed for him if he
can't afford one does convey the right.70 Even if the police know
that a defendant is aware of his rights, can afford counsel, or has a
specific counsel, the better practice is to still warn him.71 The state
has a high burden to prove knowledge or non-indigence.
72
There is no need to warn a defendant of the possible collater-
al consequences of his statement. Thus he need not be told
of the applicability of the felony-murder doctrine,73 of his right to
challenge a prior search and seizure,74 or of the possible use of his
statement in a different jurisdiction.
75
There is no need to tell a defendant that his oral statement
can be used against him. The general warning that "anything you
say" can be used is sufficient. 76 There is no need to warn a
juvenile suspect that he can have his parents or other mature
presons present, although it is a significant factor going to the va-
States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970) ("could"). See Common-
wealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970) ("may"); Common-
wealth v. Baker, 214 Pa. Super. 27, 251 A.2d 737 (1969) ("can").
66. Commonwealth v. Davis, 440 Pa. 123, 270 A.2d 199 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970).
67. Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970).
68. Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 451 Pa. 472, 304 A.2d 102 (1973).
69. Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A.2d 481 (1970).
70. Commonwealth v. Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 296 A.2d 777 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Wood & Utley, 219 Pa. Super. 35, 275 A.2d 859 (1971). Simi-
larly, telling him that if he can not afford counsel, no questions will be
asked until a lawyer is provided for him also conveys the right to free
counsel. Commonwealth v. Jordon, 451 Pa. 275, 301 A.2d 667 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Ponton, 450 Pa. 40, 299 A.2d 634 (1972).
71. Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969).
72. Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276. 256 A.2d 464 (1969).
73. State v. McCrae, 276 N.C. 308, 172 S.E.2d 37 (1970); Commonwealth
v. McKinney, 453 Pa. 10, 306 A.2d 305 (1973).
74. United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971).
75. United States v. Scott, 460 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1972).
76. United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1968).
lidity of the waiver that parents or other mature persons were
contacted or present.
7 7
It is necessary to convey to a defendant the nature of the
charges against him.7 8 However, it is not necessary to specifically
inform him of the exact crime being investigated.7 9 So long as the
suspect is made aware of the reason he is being questioned, a
waiver of Miranda rights may be intelligently made. 0
B. Particular Suspects
Warnings must be given so as to be understood by a defend-
ant. Thus, if a defendant cannot understand English, it must be
given in the language he understands.8'
The warnings are prophylactic in nature and Miranda itself
notes that it is always better to give warnings-no matter who the
suspect is or what he says. 2 Even if a citizen indicates he knows
his rights, the officer should still continue the warnings. 83  While
particularized knowledge as indicated by phrases such as "I know
I can get a free lawyer" or "I know I don't have to talk," might be
sufficient,84 such talk could be interpreted as mere "braggado-
cio" and without validity as proof of knowledge of rights.85 In
fact, failure to warn a police officer or even a lawyer will ordinar-
ily result in suppression of his statement.
8 6
If an attorney stays with his client during questioning, there
is no need for warnings. "The presence of counsel is an ade-
quate protective device."87 However, the mere fact that a suspect
talked with or was surrendered by a lawyer, who was not present
at the time of questioning, does not mean that the suspect knew
77. In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 755 (1972); Commonwealth v. Moses, 446
Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971).
78. Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 269 A.2d 882 (1970).
79. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 278 A.2d 895 (1971).
80. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 445 Pa. 364, 284 A.2d 717 (1971).
81. United States v. Trabucco, 424 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1970); DeLaFe
v. United States, 413 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Vasquez,
18 Chester 163 (Pa. C.P. 1969). In Philadelphia, Spanish speaking police offi-
cers give Spanish warnings. Moreover, there is a Spanish warning card,
with an accurate translation of the warnings which has been upheld in
numerous suppression hearings.
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966); Commonwealth
v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1973); see Commonwealth v. Cohen,
221 Pa. Super. 244, 289 A.2d 96 (1972).
83. Brown v. Heyd, 277 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1967); Commonwealth
v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
84. See Kear v. United States, 369 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1966).
85. Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1973).
86. United States v. Millen, 338 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Cohen, 221 Pa. Super. 244, 289 A.2d 96 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Schwartz, 210 Pa. Super. 360, 233 A.2d 904 (1967).
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). See United States
v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1968).
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of his rights. Proof of warnings and a waiver are required.8 The
right to silence and to have a lawyer present are personal rights.
A lawyer's instruction to the police does not bind the police or the
suspect.8 9 Of course, such an instruction is a significant factor in de-
termining whether a waiver of rights was knowledgeable, intelli-
gent and voluntary. 0
Miranda, of course, applies to juveniles, whether tried as adults
or not.9 1 While the circumstances of a juvenile's confession must
be examined with greater scrutiny than that of an adult,92 there
is no requirement that a youth's parents be present during interro-
gations or that they be advised of the suspect's rights.93 However,
there is an obligation to notify the parents promptly of an arrest
and the failure of the police to afford parents an opportunity to
talk to the defendant may be proof that the waiver of rights was
not freely, intelligently, and knowingly made.94 Similarly, a spe-
cific request by a juvenile suspect to see his parents may indicate
his desire to remain silent until they arrive and thus further ques-
tioning may be forbidden. 95 Of course, the presence of parents or
other adult counsel is strong evidence of a valid waiver.9 6
IV. WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
A. Nature of the Waiver
In order to satisfy Miranda, the prosecution must show that
88. See Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Learning, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968). See also
Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971) (warnings
given-confession valid).
89. See United States v. Moriarty, 375 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 448 Pa. 206, 292 A.2d 302 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260 A.2d 793 (1970).
90. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 448 Pa. 206, 292 A.2d 302 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260 A.2d 793 (1970). See also Com-
monwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 307 A.2d 229 (1973).
91. See In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 599 (1973); In re Betrand,
451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973).
92. Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 452 Pa. 397, 305 A.2d 25 (1973).
93. Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 755 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441
Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970).
94. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 55-101 to -337 (Supp. 1973). See also
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Commonwealth v. Harmon,
440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970).
95. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
96. Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa. 359, 304 A.2d 150 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972); Commonwealth v. Moses, 446
Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971).
the suspect made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of
his fifth amendment rights.9 7 Whether such a waiver occurred is a
question of fact to be determined by the trial judge.0
8
Miranda itself states that a waiver may be validly shown by
an express statement that the individual is willing to make a state-
ment without an attorney.99 However, the mere giving of the
warnings without an acknowledgement of knowledge and under-
standing by the suspect may not be sufficient to show a waiver.10
The waiver need not be in writing,' 1' and an agreement to give
only an oral statement or a refusal to sign a written waiver or
formal statement does not affect the validity of an earlier waiver
or oral statement. 10 2 Of course, the signing of a written waiver by
a literate suspect is a good indication of an acceptable waiver.
10 3
A waiver may not be inferred from silence.10 4 However, a
clear, unequivocal acknowledgement of understanding and willing-
ness to speak is sufficient, whether non-verbal or verbal. 05
I. d suspec. nuUid-Ltea i IIW~L tU rea - vV
a lawyer, all questioning must stop.10 However, a suspect may
be told of changed circumstances, such as the death of a victim,
and asked again if he wishes to waive his rights' 0 7  Similarly, a
suspect may voluntarily and spontaneously give a statement after
invoking the privilege. So long as the statement is not the result
97. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966); United States
v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 432
Pa. 423, 248 A.2d 231 (1968).
98. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harmon,
440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 225 Pa. Super.
208, 310 A.2d 406 (1973).
99. 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). See Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa.
9, 11, 225 A.2d 691 (1967).
100. Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970).
101. United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422, 311 A.2d 572 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971).
102. United States v. Devall, 462 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Pettyjohn
v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Thomp-
son, 417 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1969); Hodge v. United States, 392 F.2d 552
(5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Canales, Pa. , A.2d (1973);
Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972).
103. Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Goldsmith, 274 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). See Commonwealth
v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970).
105. United States v. Boykin, 398 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1968); State v.
Flores, 9 Ariz. App. 502, 454 P.2d 172 (1969) (Nod); Mullaney v. State, 5
Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1968) (Nod).
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966); Commonwealth
v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 3{7 A.2d 922 (1973). See Virgin Islands v.
Aguino, 378 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1,
281 A.2d 852 (1971).
107. Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A.2d 852 (1971).
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of police questioning, it is volunteered and thus admissible 0 8 But
this statement must be truly volunteered and the Commonwealth
has a heavy burden to show that the subsequent waiver was not
the result of inducements or tricks.10 9
What constitutes invocation of the privilege and thus the end
to permissible questioning depends on the nature of the response
to the warnings. When a defendant asks for counsel, question-
ing must stop. However, if the defendant merely calls his
lawyer, an otherwise valid waiver is not affected. 110 Even if the
defendant, after being told of his right to have an attorney pres-
ent, mentions the name of his lawyer, that alone does not invoke
the privilege. Subsequent actions, such as telling the police "not to
bother," combined with an otherwise valid waiver, may allow
questioning.'11
B. Intelligence, Knowledgeability and Voluntariness of Waiver
The standards to determine whether a waiver was freely, intel-
ligently and voluntarily given are similar to the pre-Miranda stan-
dards used to determine if a confession was voluntary. Age, intelli-
gence, mental and physical condition, and police tactics are the
chief factors.112 Determination as to whether a waiver is valid
is ordinarily a question of fact for the hearing judge.
13
Age and Intelligence.-While the circumstances of a juvenile's
confession must be examined with special scrutiny," 4 merely be-
cause a suspect is a juvenile does not mean that he cannot waive his
rights.11 5 If a juvenile is accompanied by a parent or given other
108. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970). See
notes 45-61 and accompanying text supra.
109. United States v. Hill, 340 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Compare
Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971), with Common-
wealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 290 A.2d 62 (1972). Compare Commonwealth
v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 307 A.2d 229 (1973), with Commonwealth v. Young-
blood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973).
110. Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971). See
State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366, 283 A.2d 321 (1971).
111. Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 301 A.2d 832 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 290 A.2d 62 (1972).
112. Commonwealth v. Taper, 434 Pa. 71, 253 A.2d 90 (1969).
113. Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 225 Pa. Super. 208, 310 A.2d 406 (1973).
Compare Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970), with
Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), and Common-
wealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971), and Commonwealth
v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 309 A.2d 569 (1973).
114. Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 452 Pa. 397, 305 A.2d 25 (1973).
115. United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 450 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.
1971); Commonwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973) (14 year
independent adult guidance, it is strong evidence of a valid
waiver.1 16 Intelligence, including educational background, are key
factors in determining whether a juvenile's waiver is knowing and
intelligent. Psychiatric or lay testimony or records may be used to
evaluate the ability to intelligently and understandingly waive
rights. The credibility of these witnesses and evidence is for the
trial judge, who may accept or reject all, some, or none.
11 7
Mental and Physical Capacity.-Insanity or incompetency pre-
cludes a knowing and intelligent waiver. The test is "testimonial
capacity"-understanding of the proceedings and ability to give a
correct account."" Even with such capacity, the psychiatric, physi-
ological or psychological condition of the defendant may still affect
his ability to waive his Miranda rights. The test is whether the
effect of the condition is such as to deprive a defendant of his ra-
tional intellect and free will thus precluding a knowledgeable, in-
telligent and voluntary waiver.1 9 The condition may be caused by
r-,,,-ts Qlr-.nhI hrd.rMl jini or yrtehintrir imh~lpnrp Tf re-
sponses are alert and intelligent, a waiver could be valid.120 If the
will of the defendant is overborne by his condition, the waiver is
not a free and voluntary act.'2 ' Coherence, competency and respon-
siveness are subject to proof by testimony and exhibits. Credibil-
old); Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219
Pa. Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971). See Commonwealth v. Moore, 400
Pa. 86, 270 A.2d 200 (1970) (pre-Miranda-13 year old psychopath); Com-
monwealth v. Willman, 434 Pa. 489, 255 A.2d 534 (1969) (pre-Miranda-
mental defective-60 I.Q.); Commonwealth ex rel. Joyner v. Brierley, 429
Pa. 156, 239 A.2d 434 (1968) (pre-Miranda-18 year old-80 I.Q.).
116. Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa. 359, 304 A.2d 150 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973). See notes 91-96
and accompanying text supra.
117. Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 451 Pa. 472, 304 A.2d 102 (1973) (3rd
grade education); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 451 Pa. 163, 301 A.2d 841
(1973) (73 I.Q.); Commonweatlh v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902
(1971) (illiterate and 69 I.Q.); Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa. 85,
277 A.2d 781 (1971) (8th grade education and 17 years old); Common-
wealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971) ("brainwashed"-confes-
sion valid); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970)
(confession valid-16 year old, 71 I.Q.); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219
Pa. Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971) (18 year old).
118. Commonwealth v. Mozillo, 443 Pa. 171, 278 A.2d 874 (1971).
119. United States ex rel. Cronan v. Mancusi, 444 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1971); Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Davenport, 449 Pa. 263, 295 A.2d 596 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968).
120. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 309 A.2d 569 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 296 A.2d 777 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hill,
444 Pa. 323, 281 A.2d 859 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 225 Pa. Super.
208, 310 A.2d 406 (1973).
121. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 449 Pa. 263, 295 A.2d 596 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Jackamowicz, 443 Pa. 313, 279 A.2d 7 (1971).
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ity and degree of disfunction are questions for the judge to re-
solve.
122
Coercion.-A waiver cannot be freely, intelligently and volun-
tarily entered if the method to secure it was coercive.123 Of course,
any physical violence imposed on the defendant to secure a waiver
or statement renders that statement inadmissible. 124 But to make
out a claim of physical abuse, evidence of beatings must relate to
the instant interrogation. Past experience of a suspect or his asso-
ciates does not render a waiver or confession invalid. 125 And
whether or not there was a physical beating, indicating coercion,
is a question of fact and credibility to be decided by the supression
judge.
126
Threats or coercive promises renders a statement invalid. Any
trickery or cajolery is prohibited. 127 While explicit or implicit
promises of leniency ordinarily make a waiver and subsequent
statement invalid,128 an accurate statement, such as that the police
officer would advise the prosecutor and the court of cooperation, 129
does not render the waiver or confession involuntary or inadmissi-
ble. Confrontation of a defendant with evidence or co-defend-
ants3 0 or with a polygraph examination' 3 does not taint an other-
wise admissible waiver or confession. Of course, such confronta-
122. United States ex rel. Cronan v. Mancusi, 444 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1971); United States v. Welsh, 417 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth
v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973); Commonwealth v. Miller, 448
Pa. 114, 290 A.2d 62 (1972); Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247
A.2d 228 (1968).
123. Commonwealth v. Jackamowicz, 443 Pa. 313, 279 A.2d 7 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971). For cases
on the analogous pre-Miranda issue, see Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 601 (1961); Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 194 A.2d 221 (1963).
124. Commonwealth v. Hollowell, 444 Pa. 221, 282 A.2d 327 (1971).
125. Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971).
126. Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 301 A.2d 832 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973).
127. Thus, a threat to lock up a defendant's wife, to beat him up if
he does not make a statement, or a promise to secure medical treatment
for an injured or suffering suspect only if he waives and confesses renders
the confession inadmissible. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Collins v. Ma-
roney, 287 F. Supp. 420 (E.D .Pa. 1968).
128. Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971).
129. United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1971); State v.
Geldart, 111 N.H. 219, 279 A.2d 588 (1971).
130. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKinney, 453 Pa. 10, 306 A.2d 305
(1973); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971).
131. Tyler v. Peyton, 294 F. Supp. 1351, 1352 (E.D. Va. 1968); Com-
monwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939); State v. Ridgely, 251 S.C. 556, 164
S.E.2d 439 (1968).
tions or polygraph examinations are proper only if a defendant is
duly warned and then waives his rights. They are not substitutes
for warnings to secure "volunteered" statements.
3 2
"Subtle inducements" do not necessarily invalidate confessions.
Thus, describing the procedure by which a confession is to be re-
corded, 133 telling a defendant what the police believe to be his in-
volvement, 3 4 or agreeing to carry out a defendant's request 35 are
not considered prohibited trickery. Such "subtle inducements,"
however, may not be used to convince a suspect to change his mind
and waive his rights after he has already exercised his privilege.' 3 6
Nor may they be used in lieu of or as part of warnings to secure a
waiver, but rather they may only be used after warnings and a
knowing and intelligent waiver. 37  Of course, a purely subjective
impression by a defendant, without any objective indication of
police action, is not an inducement.'
C. Duration of Questioning and Waiver
Time of Warnings.-There is no requirement that a suspect be
warned immediately upon his arrest. As long as warnings are
given and a waiver received before the interrogation itself the pro-
cedure is proper. 3 9 Of course, an overlong delay prior to warnings
may be a factor of a "softening up process" indicating that the
waiver is not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. This factor is to
be considered, with all others, to determine the validity of a wai-
ver.
1 40
Duration of Waiver.-There is no requirement that once a de-
fendant is warned and waives Miranda rights, he must be re-
warned and rewaive before each and every time he is questioned
nor that the officer who warned him be the same one to question
him and hear his confession. 141 The factors to be evaluated in de-
132. See Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971) (no warn-
ings); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) (warn-
ings); Commonwealth v. Learning, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968) (no
warnings).
133. State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366, 283 A.2d 321 (1971).
134. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 93 (1971).
135. See Brown v. Brierley, 438 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970).
136. Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971).
137. Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970).
138. Commonwealth v. LaCourt, 448 Pa. 86, 292 A.2d 377 (1972).
139. Commonwealth v. Parks, 453 Pa. 296, 309 A.2d 725 (1973).
140. Virgin Islands v. Malone, 457 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Bartlett, 446 Pa. 392, 288 A.2d 796 (1972);. Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 219 Pa. Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971).
141. Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449, 309 A.2d 589 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Parks, 453 Pa. 296, 309 A.2d 725 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Dennis, 451 Pa. 340, 304 A.2d 111 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449
Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972); Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278
A.2d 902 (1971).
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termining whether a waiver has become stale or remote by the time
of a statement are:
1) length of time since warnings and waiver were given;
2) whether the statement was given in the same place as the
warnings and waiver;
3) whether the same officer gave the warnings and took the
statements;
4) whether the information elicited during the interrogation
was significantly different than other prior statements.
142
Length of Interrogation.-Continuous questioning of a sus-
pect can indicate an overborne will and an ineffective waiver.
143
To render the interrogation involuntary, the questioning must be
continuous and long periods of custody have been upheld where the
questioning is intermittent. 4 4 Ability to use lavatory facilities,
eat, rest and relax are all considered in determining whether the
length of questioning is coercive. 4 5 Fatigue, alone, may but need
not necessarily make a waiver involuntary.
46
Recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 147 have
142. Commonwealth v. Clark, 449 Pa. 453, 309 A.2d 589 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Parks, 453 Pa. 256, 309 A.2d 725 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449
Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58
(1971); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 445 Pa. 8, 282 A.2d 276 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Ferguson, 444 Pa. 478, 282 A.2d 378 (1971).
143. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973).
144. See Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 17 (3d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966) (48 hours of questioning;
confession five days after arrest); United States ex rel. Peterson v. LaVal-
lee, 279 F.2d 396, 399 (2d Cir. 1960) (intermittent questioning of 69 hours),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 922 (1961); Thompson v. Pepersack, 270 F. Supp.
793, 796-98 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 413 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1969) (12 hours);
Commonwealth v. Biebighauser, 450 Pa. 336, 300 A.2d 70 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970); Commonwealth v. Will-
man, 434 Pa. 489, 255 A.2d 534 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v.
Myers, 433 Pa. 25, 249 A.2d 337 (1969); Commonwealth v. Hornberger,
430 Pa. 413, 415, 243 A.2d 341, 342 (1968) (20 hours before confession); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Joyner v. Brierley, 429 Pa. 156, 239 A.2d 434 (1968)
(10 hours); Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 423 Pa. 432, 224 A.2d 625 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A.2d 291 (1966); Commonwealth
v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
145. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 301 A.2d 832 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971); Commonwealth v. Moore,
440 Pa. 86, 270 A.2d 200 (1970); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219 Pa. Super.
459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971).
146. Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972).
147. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); Corn-
held that the state criminal procedure rules148 require the sup-
pression of evidence resulting from "unnecessary delay in a prelimi-
nary arraignment." This doctrine applies to any confession ob-
tained after January 1, 1965.149 As to confessions taken before the
applicability date or in cases where no specific challenge was made
as to delay, the earlier standard of continuous versus intermittent
questioning applies. 50
V. MIRANDA AND OTHER RULES
A. Miranda and Massiah
In a pre-Miranda decision, Massiah v. United States, 51 the
United States Supreme Court prohibited questioning and the se-
curing of a statement without the presence of counsel after the de-
fendant has entered the formal criminal process and after he had
secured, requested or been assigned counsel.152 However, as the
right to remain silent and to have counsel present is a personal
right of the suspect, he may, of course, waive it." 3 The waiver
must be specific as to his right to counsel,154 and must be knowing,
intelligent and voluntary,' 5 Upon request for counsel all ques-
tioning must stop.
1 56
monwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973). See discussion
in notes 158-169 and accompanying text infra.
148. PA. R. C~aw. P. 118.
149. Futch and Tingle applied rule 118, effective May 1, 1970. In Com-
monwealth v. Peters, 453 Pa. 615, 306 A.2d 901 (1973), the court stated that
the principles in those cases merely applied the already existing law and
held that the doctrine was to be retroactively applied to any confession
after the effective date of the Rule. In Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa.
547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973), the court applied the same doctrine, under the
authority of former PA. R. CalM. P. 116 (a) (superseded by Rule 118), to
all confessions after the effective date of that rule-January 1, 1965. See
In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 58 n.9, 309 A.2d 559, 563 n.9 (1973) (applying
the Futch/Tingle rule to juvenile proceedings).
150. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Biebighauser, 450 Pa. 336, 300 A.2d 70 (1973).
151. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1967).
152. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States ex
rel. Daley v. Yeager, 415 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
O'Conner v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1969).
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); United States v.
Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1969); Davis v. Burke, 408 F.2d 779 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States ex tel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632
(3d Cir. 1969); Dillon v. United States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
885 (1967); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 110, 283 A.2d 58, 65 (1971).
154. Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.
1965); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 428 Pa. 564, 237 A.2d 229 (1968).
155. United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632, 636
(3d Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 110, 283 A.2d 58, 65
(1971). See United States ex rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, 430 F.2d 462, 465
(3d Cir. 1970).
156. Compare United States ex rel. Daley v. Yeager, 415 F.2d 779 (3d
Cir. 1969), with United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 450 F.2d 517 (3d
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This Massiah rule has been somewhat limited by Miranda. If a
suspect is fully warned of his Miranda rights and waives them, he
has elected to speak without counsel, thus in effect waiving his
Massiah rights as well.
157
B. Miranda and McNabb-Mallory
In a series of cases, McNabb v. United States' 58 and Mallory
v. United States,159 the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 5) to preclude the admis-
sion of confessions taken from a defendant during a period of "un-
necessary delay" prior to arraignment. 160
A similar provision has existed in Pennsylvania since January
1, 1965.161 Until 1972, there was no per se rule mandating the
suppression of a statement because of a violation of this provi-
sion.' 62 Length of interrogation was only one factor, among many,
to be considered in determining whether a confession was volun-
tary and a waiver knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 6 3
On April 20, 1972, the Pennsulvania Supreme Court held that
its Rules preclude the use of any testimony obtained as the result
of "unnecessary delay" in a preliminary arraignment.6 4 Later de-
cisions made this doctrine applicable to all proceedings, adult or ju-
venile, 16 and all confessions taken after January 1, 1965.166
What makes a delay "unnecessary" is a question of fact. The
standard of admissibility is that the delay did not contribute to the
Cir. 1971) and Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Myers, 433 Pa. 25, 249
A.2d 337 (1969).
157. United States v. Cobbs, 481 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971);
State v. Melton, 307 Kan. 700, 486 P.2d 1361 (1971); Commonwealth v. Fron-
gillo, 359 Mass. 132, 137, 268 N.E.2d 341, 344 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hoss,
445 Pa. 98, 110-11, 283 A.2d 58 (1971).
158. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 333 (1943).
159. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
160. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957): "The pur-
pose of Federal Rule 5 is to allow the Magistrate to tell defendant of
his rights to silence and counsel."
161. PA. R. CRIM. P. 116(a) was superseded by PA. RULE CaIM. P. 118.
See notes 147-150 and accompanying text supra.
162. Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 444 Pa. 24, 279 A.2d 146 (1971).
163. See notes 143-146 and accompanying text supra.
164. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
165. In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973).
166. Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Pa. 615, 306 A.2d 901 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 615, 307 A.2d 238 (1973). See note 149 and
accompanying text supra.
securing of the evidence-that is, that the evidence had "no rea-
sonable relationship to the delay." Delay up to the securing of the
inculpatory evidence would be the ordinary measure. De-
lay after securing inculpatory evidence would ordinarily not be
relevant as it did not lead to the evidence.16 7
Delay utilized to verify a story so as to exculpate a defendant
is justified. Delay to handle normal and necessary administrative
procedures such as booking, fingerprinting, bail review, and a
records check, would also be justified. Delay solely to secure an
inculpatory statement, after repeated denials or an invocation of
the privilege against self-incrimination, would not be justified.
Delay to make arrangements for a lineup, easily scheduled after
arraignment, would not be justified.16 8
For cases involving a pre-1965 confession or where the "delay
in arraignment rule" is not raised, the question then reverts back
to whether defendant was warned of his rights and whether his
,Lnsdring the1 length. Of interrogation and all other fac-
tors, was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.'6 9
VI. MIRANDA AND TAINT
A confession that follows an illegal arrest, illegal search, or
invalid confession can only be used as evidence if it is estab-
lished that the statement was not obtained by "exploitation of the
original illegality" but was obtained under circumstances suffi-
ciently distinguishable to purge it of any original taint.'7 0  The
burden is on the state' 7' to prove that the confession resulted from
such an act of free will by the suspect or by means so attenuated
from the original illegality that it is not the fruit of the poisonous
tree. 72 For example, if the prosecution can show that the evi-
dence would have been discovered by means completely indepen-
dent of the tainted prior action, the statement is admissible.'
7 3
Arrest.-Even assuming an illegal arrest, a confession secured
thereafter is not automatically excluded. 7 4  While a free, inteli-
167. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.Zd 417 (1972).
168. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
169. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Moore, 444 Pa. 24, 279 A.2d 146 (1971).
170. Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968).
171. In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973).
172. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Rowe, 445 Pa. 454, 282 A.2d 319 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 181-83, 228 A.2d 661, 665-66 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
875 (1967).
173. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
174. Id.; Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 181-83, 228 A.2d 661,
665-66 (1967), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 875 (1967).
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gent and voluntary waiver of one's rights is, of course, necessary
to uphold a confession, more is needed than a waiver to purge the
taint of an illegal arrest.175 A statement made soon after an illegal
arrest is generally found to be tainted, absent other circumstan-
ces.176 A statement made a period of time after an illegal arrest
may be found not to be tainted. 177 A statement made after an
intervening event, such as the confession of the co-defendant impli-
cating a suspect, may be considered to be purged of the taint.178
Search and Seizure.--Similarly, a prior illegal search and seiz-
ure does not necessarily taint a subsequent statement. 17 9 The test
is the causal connection between the illegal search and seizure
and the statements. If the results of the illegal search are util-
ized to procure a confession, there is a clear taint. 8 0
Prior Unwarned Statement.-Whether a properly secured state-
ment derives from prior illegal questioning and is thus tainted de-
pends on the totality of the circumstances.' 8 ' Clearly, if prior
questioning was as to an unrelated offense, there is no taint.
8 2
Similarly, where a defendant indicates he wishes to speak to "get
it off his chest" or to "purge his conscience," the later statement
may not be the result of exploitation of any prior illegality. 8 3 If
the police confront a defendant with the statements of co-defen-
dants or witnesses or properly secured evidence, the later properly
warned statement would not be the result of prior illegality but
175. In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973).
176. Id.
177. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 93 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Jacobs, 445 Pa. 364, 284 A.2d 717 (1971).
178. Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 755 (1973).
179. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
180. Commonwealth v. Rowe, 445 Pa. 454, 282 A.2d 319 (1971). See
United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971) (no prior information utilized,
confession valid); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279 A.2d 33
(1971).
181. Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 44, 239 A.2d 409, 412 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 882 (1968).
182. United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971). See Com-
monwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A.2d 852 (1971). Of course, the length and
nature of the interrogation are factors to be considered in determining
whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
183. Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A.2d 409 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 882 (1968).
would come from the separate source.1 8 4
If the later properly warned interrogation is separated in
time and place from the original questioning, there is a distinct
break in the stream of events indicated that the later statement is
purged of any taint. 8 5 This is especially true if different police
officers, not knowing of prior unwarned questioning, are in-
volved.18 6 The use of information derived from a prior unwarned
statement (or illegal evidence) may "weigh heavily on the sus-
pect's mind" and thus taint a subsequent confession given after
warnings.18 7  But if the prior statements were exculpatory or
non-damaging, later warned incriminatory statements may not
be tainted. 8
Of course, the most important element to determine the lack of
taint is whether the Miranda warnings were given and understood
at a time early enough to allow the suspect to take advantage of
them. The wearing down of a suspect by continuous questioning
and custody might indicate taint as well as the lack of a valid wai-
ver. On the other hand, warnings and a waiver given at a stage
early enough to allow a knowing waiver points to lack of taint.18 9
VII. PROCEDURE
In accord with Jackson v. Denno, 90 a defendant is entitled to
a separate proceeding to determine the admissibility of a state-
ment. The procedure to be followed in Pennsylvania is detailed
in Rule 323, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 191
A. The Hearing
The suppression hearing may be either prior to or at the
184. Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971).
185. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966); Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 93 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445
Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279
A.2d 33 (1971). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ware, 438 Pa. 519, 265 A.2d 790
(1970).
186. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966); Commonwealth
v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971); Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 93 (1971); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 445 Pa. 364,
284 A.2d 717 (1971).
187. Commonwealth v. Rowe, 445 Pa. 454, 282 A.2d 319 (1971).
188. Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 446 Pa. 392, 288 A.2d 796 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Mitchell, 445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 93 (1971); Commonwealth v. Fra-
zier, 443 Pa. 178, 279 A.2d 33 (1971).
189. United States v. Shea, 436 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1970); State v. Wade,
116 N.J. Super. 449, 282 A.2d 763 (1971); Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
445 Pa. 461, 285 A.2d 293 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435,
283 A.2d 285 (1971).
190. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1969).
191. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 450 Pa. 372, 301 A.2d 631 (1973).
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trial.19 2 The state must sustain its heavy burden of showing
that the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his rights by first comming forth with evidence to
prove admissibility and then by proving admissibility by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 193 If the state says it does not intend to
introduce a confession, that decision is binding and the statement
may not be used at trial.9 4 Similarly, contentions that a state-
ment was never made or is inaccurate cannot be raised by a de-
fendant at a suppression hearing. They are questions of fact-go-
ing to the credibility of the witnesses presenting the evidence-
and thus solely for the fact finder at trial.195 Ordinarily, the testi-
mony of one or more state witnesses is sufficient to show a valid
waiver 96 and thereafter the defendant must show such waiver to
be invalid.197 Warnings may be read from a card, given orally,
or written. The waiver may be indicated from the recollec-
tion of the police officer, his notes, or from signed notations by a
defendant on a formal statement. 198
At the suppression hearing, the judge may hear and evaluate
all evidence. He may properly read, consider and evaluate the ac-
tual confession-not for its truthfulness but for its value as proof
of warnings and a valid waiver. 9" He may consider a defendant's
prior police or criminal contacts to evaluate the experience a de-
fendant has had and thus the knowledgeability of his waiver.
200
Credibility and resolution of conflicting pieces of evidence are ques-
tions for the suppression judge.2 1'
B. The Trial
The suppression judge may clearly sit as the trial judge
192. PA. R. Canm. P. 323(b), (c). See Commonwealth v. Brown, 226
Pa. Super. 30, 312 A.2d 428 (1973).
193. Lego v. Towmey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ravenell,
448 Pa. 162, 292 A.2d 365 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle,
429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968).
194. Commonwealth v. Tull, 224 Pa. Super. 494, 307 A.2d 318 (1973).
195. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 305 A.2d 5 (1973).
196. United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972). See
Commonwealth v. Ezell, 440 Pa. 92, 269 A.2d 462 (1970).
197. Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971).
198. See Moll v. United States, 413 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Goldsmith, 274 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
199. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971).
200. Jordon v. United States, 421 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970); People v.
Pierce, 260 Cal. App. 2d 652, 67 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1968); State v. Miller,
35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joseph, 451 Pa. 440, 304 A.2d 163
(1973).
in a jury trial. If the trial is before a judge alone, the sup-
pression judge may also sit as the trial judge, unless prejudice is
shown.20 2 The decision of the suppression judge is final and binding
at trial.20 3 However, while the Constitution does not require it,
20 4
the defendant may, under Pennsylvania Rules, raise the question
of voluntariness at trial.20 5 Of course, failure to raise that issue, like
any other issue at trial, could result in the proper removal of the is-
sue from the fact finder's consideration. 20 6  Voluntariness need
only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
20 7
If the State said it would not introduce the confession at trial,
that decision is binding and the confession must be treated as sup-
pressed and thus inadmissible.2 8 Recently, in Harris v. New
York, 209 the United States Supreme Court has decided that confes-
sions inadmissible under Miranda may be used to impeach a de-
fendant who has testified. While most courts have followed this
holding and have allowed the use of such statements for impeach-
ment purposes,-1  Pennsylvania courts have not yet overruled
their previous decisions 211 precluding the use of such state-
ments for any purpose.2 12 Of course, even under Harris, an invol-
untary, as distinguished from a contra-Miranda confession may still
not be used at al.211
C. Appellate Review
The lower court's evaluation of the evidence of coercion,
physical or mental abiility, warnings and a waiver are binding
and his findings of fact are not subject to review, so long as
they are supported by the record. 21 4  However, his conclusions
202. Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 301 A.2d 837 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Corbin, 447 Pa. 463, 291 A.2d 307 (1972).
203. PA. R. Canvi. P. 323(j); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle,
429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1969).
204. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
205. PA. R. CRm. P. 323 (j); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle,
429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1969).
206. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973).
207. Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 301 A.2d 832 (1973).
208. Commonwealth v. Tull, 224 Pa. Super. 494, 307 A.2d 318 (1973).
209. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
210. See, e.g., United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972).
211. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
212. See Commonwealth v. Tull, 224 Pa. Super. 494, 307 A.2d 318
(1973); Commonwealth v. Horner, 453 Pa. 435, 441, 309 A.2d 552, 555 (1973)
(concurring opinion of J. Roberts).
213. United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972).
214. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 305 A.2d 5 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Ravenell, 448 Pa. 162, 292 A.2d 365 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Moore, 444 Pa. 24, 279 A.2d 146 (1971); Commonwealth v. Camm, 443
Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279
A.2d 33 (1971); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Corbin, 440 Pa. 65, 269 A-2d 475 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Murphy, 219 Pa. Super. 459, 281 A.2d 685 (1971).
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of law, including determinations of ultimate facts, such as whether
particular words or actions constitute a waiver, are subject to
review.215 The review is limited to a consideration of the testi-
mony of the witnesses of the party successful below, and so
much of the testimony of other witnesses as stands uncontra-
dicted.
216
PART 1--SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
VIII. INTRODUCTION
The basis for the search and seizure exclusionary rule is found
in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution which
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, paper and effects, against unreasonable searches
shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be searched.
217
On February 24, 1914, the Supreme Court held that, in federal
criminal cases, violations of this Amendment would require the
exclusion at trial of any evidence derived from such actions.
218
On June 19, 1961, this "exclusionary rule" was extended to
criminal cases 219 in the state courts.
220
IX. WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The general rule is that, in order to search a person or prop-
215. Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973).
216. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Davenport, 449 Pa. 263, 295 A.2d 596 (1972).
217. U.S. CONST. amend. III. Similarly, PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 8 pro-
vides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures and no war-
rant to search any place or to seize any person or thing shall issue
without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.
While recent opinions by the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court have indicated dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule (see
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 217 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)), several Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices have indicated that
the exclusionary rule can be applied in this Commonwealth under provisions
such as article 1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution.
218. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
219. Thus, it applies to adjudicatory hearings in juvenile court. In
re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972).
220. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
erty, a search warrant must be obtained.22 1 There are, of course, ex-
ceptions, which will be discussed later.22 2
A. Constitutional Requirements
In accord with the United States (and Pennsylvania 223 ) Consti-
tuition, a warrant:
1. must be issued by a neutral and detached Magistrate on
oath or affirmation;
2. must particularly describe the premises or person to be
searched;
3. must specifically describe the property to be seized;
and,
4. must show probable cause to believe that evidence
would be found.
(1) Neutral and Detached Magistrate upon Oath Affirmation
As a matter of federal constitutional law, a state may allow
any impartial agency to act as an authorized magistrate to issue a
warrant. A District Attorney or Attorney General is not considered
to be so impartial as to be acceptable as a neutral and detached eval-
uator.2 24 A lay municipal clerk, removed from the prosecutor and
the police and subject to supervision by the Court, is constitutionally
acceptable. 25 However, under Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 2 6 only a judicial officer termed an issuing authority,2" 7
with jurisdiction over the person or place to be searched, may ap-
prove a search warrant.
"Upon oath or affirmation" means that, constitutionally, oral
sworn testimony before the Magistrate may be considered in addi-
tion to the warrant and affidavits attached to the warrant."28
221. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
222. These exceptions are (1) search by consent, see notes 322-45 and
accompanying text infra; (2) searches in emergencies see notes 346-55 and
accompanying text infra; (3) searches and seizures of items in plain view,
see notes 356-68 and accompanying text infra; (4) searches incident to
arrest, see notes 369-438 and accompanying text infra; (5) stops and frisks,
see notes 439-53 and accompanying text infra; and (6) stops and searches
of automobiles, see notes 454-74 and accompanying text infra.
223. See note 217 supra.
224. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
225. Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
226. PA. R. CRiM. P. 2001.
227. An "issuing authority is any Justice, law or law-trained Municipal
Court or Common Pleas Court judge, justice of the peace, or magistrate."
PA. R. Cani. P. 3 (f).
228. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Connor, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A2d 341 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jones, 452
Pa. 299, 304 A.2d 684 (1973); Commonwealth v. Krukoff, 223 Pa. Super.
395, 302 A.2d 388 (1973); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 223 Pa. Super. 107,
296 A.2d 848 (1972); Commonwealth v. Billock, 221 Pa. Super. 441, 289
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However, under Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, for any
search warrant issued after May 28, 1973, no oral testimony before
the issuing authority may be considered. 2 9 Of course, if additional
information is added to an affidavit before the affidavit is sworn
to before the issuing authority, or is submitted in a separate affi-
davit, it is perfectly acceptable and can be considered in determin-
ing probable cause.
230
(2) Complete Description of Person or Premises to be Searched
A description of the premises to be searched may be by house
number or by any other method sufficiently specific to clearly iden-
tify the premises.23 '- Where the place to be searched is an apart-
ment or room within a building, the warrant must specify which
apartment or room is to be searched. This may also be done by
apartment number of specific description.
23 2
An incorrect house or apartment number is not fatal where the
physical description is sufficiently detailed so that the proper loca-
tion is clear 233 or where the information as to the location of the
premises is derived from false statements of the person whose
residence is to be searched.23 4 Similarly, if specific information is
unavailable, as where there is no reason to believe a residence is a
A.2d 749 (1972).
Of course, if no oral testimony was presented prior to the issuance
of the warrant, the validity of the warrant must turn solely on the ade-
quacy of the information contained in the written affidavits themselves.
Commonwealth v. Bedford, 451 Pa. 325, 304 A.2d 453 (1972). And, of
course, sworn oral testimony, added to the information in the warrant,
may still not equal probable cause. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa.
624, 301 A.2d 819 (1973).
229. PA. R. CpaM. P. 2003(a), (b). See Commonwealth v. Milliken,
450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78 (1973).
230. PA. R. Calm. P. 2003(a) provides that a search warrant may issue
upon "one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority." Thus,
so long as the information is included prior to being sworn to, it is ad-
missible in determining the validity of the search warrant. In order to
avoid possible problems and to facilitate the issuance of warrants, the Phil-
adelphia District Attorney's Office has prepared, and the Philadelphia Po-
lice have adopted, a new form to be kept at all courts, including the pre-
liminary arraignment court at the Police Administration Building, to be
filled out when information is received after preparation of the warrant
or when additional information is thought desirable by the assigned Assist-
ant District Attorney. This affidavit is then submitted together with the
original warrant to the issuing authority.
231. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 290 Pa. 181, 138 A.2d 682 (1927).
232. Commonwealth v. Smyser, 205 Pa. Super. 599, 605, 211 A.2d 59, 63
(1965).
233. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971).
234. State v. Wright, 113 N.J. Super. 79, 272 A.2d 758 (1971).
multi-person dwelling or is not being used as a single unit, a war-
rant for the whole residence is valid.
23 5
A description of a person to be searched may be by name or
physical attributes. However, it must be clear whether a particu-
lar person or a particular residence, where that person may reside,
is to be searched.
23 6
(3) Complete Description of the Things to be Seized
A search warrant may be issued for contraband, fruits of a
crime, property used to commit a crime, or objects dangerous in
themselves. 237 It may also be issued for "mere evidence of a
crime. '23 8  The general rule is that items not mentioned in the
warrant may not be seized.239 However, particularity should not
be hypertechnically applied to invalidate a good faith search and
it is not required that the items be identified beyond a general
classification.
24 0
A search under a warrant may extend to items reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of a search. 241 But it cannot be extended to
distinct items that were or should have been anticipated by the
affiant.
24 2
Items not included in the warrant and nevertheless seized will
be excluded from evidence. But failure to include such items does
not invalidate the seizure of the included items.
248
(4) Probable Cause
A search warrant affidavit must contain sufficient information
upon which the magistrate can independently conclude that there
is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized can be
found at the premises or on the person described.244  Although
235. Commonwealth v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Super. 63, 224 A.2d 228
(1966).
236. Commonwealth v. Muscheck, 222 Pa. Super. 348, 294 A.2d 809
(1972).
237. See PA. R. Csm. P. 2002 (a), (b); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
238. See PA. R. Cmms. P. 2002(c); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
,(1967).
239. Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195 A.2d 119 (1963).
240. Anglin v. Director, 439 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 291 A.2d 89 (1972) (bloody clothing); Common-
wealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971) (knife).
241. United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd,
278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 823 (1960).
242. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See Common-
wealth v. Searles, 450 Pa. 384, 302 A.2d 335 (1973) (notebook not included
within checkwriting equipment).
243. Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195 A.2d 119 (1963).
See Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972).
244. PA. R. Cawm. P. 2003(a); Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 215 Pa.
Super. 246, 257 A.2d 341 (1969). See Commonwealth v. Muschek, 222 Pa.
Super. 348, 294 A.2d 809 (1972).
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the standards for determining probable cause for a search and sei-
zure are the same as to determine probable cause for an arrest,245
the probable cause in a search warrant must relate to evidence or
items to be searched or seized, while probable cause to arrest re-
lates only to a basis to believe a criminal offense has been or is be-
ing committed.
246
Probable cause is defined as where an affiant has knowledge
of sufficient facts and circumstances, gained through trustworthy
information, to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed and evidence would
be found at the described location.247 Only a probability and not
a prima facie showing of criminal activity is required.24 The
affidavits of probable cause must be interpreted in a common sense
and realistic fashion. The resolution of doubtful cases should be
in favor of the validity of the warrant.2 49 The measure is not what
might be probable cause to an untrained layman, but what is suf-
ficient in light of the special skill and training of the affiant,
especially a policeman.
50
The affiant may base his request for a warrant on circumstan-
tial evidence. If the pieces of information furnish a reasonable
basis for criminal activity and evidence of a crime, there is proba-
ble cause.25 1 Similarly, the affidavit may be derived from multi-
ple sources-informants, victims, eye witnesses, official records. If
a common sense reading of the affidavit indicates sufficient reason
245. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969); Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 326, 309 A.2d 413
(1973.).
246. Compare Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Agui-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 103 (1964), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See
also notes 319-422 and accompanying text infra.
247. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Common-
wealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 158, 253 A.2d 276, 279 (1969).
248. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); United States v. Gimelstob, 475
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 A.2d
213 (1973): Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 215 Pa. Super. 246, 257 A.2d
341 (1969).
249. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965); Common-
wealth v. Billock, 221 Pa. Super. 441, 289 A.2d 749 (1972).
250. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 198 Pa. Super. 51, 182 A.2d 541 (1962),
adopting as its opinion 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 301 (Phila. 1961). See Common-
wealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d 785 (1972).
251. Commonwealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d 785 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).
See also Commonwealth v. DeFlemingue, 450 Pa. 163, 299 A.2d 246 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292 A.2d 352 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
to believe that evidence related to criminal activity may be found,
there is probable cause.
25 2
If all the information is derived from the personal knowledge or
observation of the affiant, there is no need for any further inquiry.
Probable cause is based on the contents of his information and his
credibility or the reliability of the information can be observed by
the magistrate. However, it is more likely that the information will
be, at least in part, based on statements from other sources. This
hearsay may also be considered if substantiation is shown by:
1) sufficient underlying circumstances to show that the
informant reached a proper conclusion that criminal
activity is afoot and that evidence would be found at
the named premises.255 This requirement must be met
by setting forth in detail the manner in which the in-
formant received his information or by describing the
criminal activity in detail and the evidence related to
that activity which the informant observed;
254
and
2) sufficient underlying circumstances upon which the
affiant concluded that the informant was credible or
that his information was reliable.255 The credibility of
the informant may be shown by the informant's past
reliability or inherent reliability.25 6 Even assuming
such credibility can't be shown, the basis for the war-
rant may be shown through corroboration of the infor-
252. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292 A.2d 352 (1972). See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Billock, 221 Pa. Super. 441, 289 A.2d 749 (1972). Of course, merely
because there are many pieces of information does not necessarily mean
that there is any more than allegations. The information must still be
reliable and must indicate a reasonable basis for a belief. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Emerich, 225 Pa. Super. 163, 310 A.2d 390 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Suppa, 223 Pa. Super. 513, 302 A.2d 357 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Falk, 221 Pa. Super. 43, 290 A.2d 125 (1972).
253. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1969); Commonwealth v. Emerich, 225 Pa. Super. 163, 310 A.2d
390 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347
(1973); Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 215 Pa. Super. 246, 249-50, 257 A.2d
341, 343 (1969).
254. Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 465, 289 A.2d 119, 123 (1972).
See Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 326, 309 A.2d 415 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Manduchi, 222 Pa. Super. 562, 295 A.2d 130 (1972) (no basis
for source of facts); Commonwealth v. Massie, 221 Pa. Super. 453, 292 A.2d
508 (1972).
255. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Commonwealth v. Emerich, 225 Pa. Super. 163, 310 A.2d
390 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347
(1973); Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 215 Pa. Super. 246, 249-50, 257 A.2d
341, 343 (1969); Commonwealth v. Payton, 212 Pa. Super. 254, 243 A.2d
202 (1968).
256. Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 465, 289 A.2d 119, 123 (1972).
See notes 265-270 infra.
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mation to show that the information itself is reliable.
257
Of course, this reliability requirement may be met by
a combination of data showing partial credibility of the
informant and partial corroboration and thus reliability
of the information.
2 58
Basis for Conclusion of Criminal Activity and Existence of Evidence
As with information derived from personal knowledge or ob-
servation, all that is required is a sufficient basis to indicate that
evidence of a crime may be found at a particular location.2 59
Specificity by the informant in describing an offense and the in-
formant's personal viewing of the offense and evidence are suffi-
cient. 260 Of course, the informant's description should be read in
a common sense manner. If the words clearly indicate to the affi-
ant, and through him to the magistrate, that a crime has been
committed and that evidence of the crime can be found, it is
sufficient.
26 1
In addition to descriptions based on personal observation, the
informant may properly base his conclusions of criminal activity
and evidence on his own participation in a criminal enter-
prise,26 2 on circumstantial evidence tied to an existing offense,263
or on statements made by the perpetrators to him.
264
Basis for Credibility of the Informant or Reliability of Information
The credibility of certain types of informants may be assumed.
If the affiant police officer receives information from a fellow po-
257. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381,
310 A.2d 347 (1973). See notes 271-72 infra.
258. CompaTe United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) with Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See note 276 infra.
259. Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
260. United States ex rel. Henderson v. Mazurkiewicz, 443 F.2d 1135
(3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Dial, 445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972).
261. Commonwealth v. Dial, 445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971) ("trans-
acting business" may be properly interpreted to mean dealing in dope);
Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972) (obvi-
ous knowledge of gambling information).
262. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972).
263. United States v. Henkel, 451 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1971). See United
States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Devlin,
221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
264. United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States ex rel. Laws v. Yeager, 448 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973).
lice officer or other law enforcement official, the information may
be relied on. The police are considered a unit and the collective
knowledge of the police is considered almost as if directly given to
the magistrate.26 5 Similarly, information from a named victim or
eyewitness may be relied upon.26  If any such "citizen informant"
wishes to remain confidential, some indication of the person's rep-
utation, employment and prior positive relationship to police is suf-
ficient to indicate that he is credible.2 67 Information from a named
co-defendant, co-conspirator, or accomplice may be considered
credible as being "declarations against penal interest.
26 8
More detailed information must be shown to support a state-
ment of a police or "confidential informant." The most common
method is a recounting of facts tending to show that the informant
has provided accurate information in the past. For example, it may
be shown that prior information has led to prior seizures, prior ar-
rests, or prior convictions. 269 An unnamed or confidential infor-
mant's credibility can also be shown by his admission of criminal
complicity-a declaration against penal interest.2
70
Even if the credibility of the informant is not shown or not
completely shown, the affidavit may state corroborating informa-
tion sufficient to justify a finding of probable cause that the infor-
mation given by the informant on the instant occasion is accurate
and reliable.271 Specific and detailed information can indicate that
265. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); United States v. Bianco,
189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297
A.2d 794 (1972). See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 A.2d
213 (.1973).
266. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 461
F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 304 A.2d
684 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972).
See Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Falk, 221 Pa. Super. 43, 290 A.2d 125 (1972).
267. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 302 A.2d 684
(1973); Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469
(1972).
268. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971); United States v. Bamber-
ger, 456 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. DiRienzo v. Yeager,
443 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Kenny, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d
794 (1972); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 219 Pa. Super. 109, 280 A.2d 430 (1971). See
Commonwealth v. Falk, 221 Pa. Super. 43, 290 A.2d 125 (1971).
269. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 n.5 (1964); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1973); Common-
wealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972). There is no
need to show that the information in the past had led to convictions. Prior
successful seizures or arrests are sufficient. People v. Jordain, 10 Ill. App.
3d 46, 294 N.E.2d 3 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381,
310 A.2d 347 (1973); Commonwealth v. Billock, 221 Pa. Super. 441, 289 A.2d
749 (1972).
270. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See Commonwealth
v. Falk, 221 Pa. Super. 43, 290 A.2d 125 (1972).
271. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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there is a basis for the information and that it is therefore reli-
able.2 2 Surveillance by the police or verification through records
may corroborate the information.2 78 Reputation or past activities
of the perpetrator or the premises may be used to verify informa-
tion.274 This corroboration may be by actions which are innocent
in themselves but which, when put together with the informant's
statements, verify the information given. 275 Of course, credibility
of the informant and reliability of the information can be shown
by a combination of facts relating to the informant or corrobora-
tion of his information.
276
B. Other Search Warrant Issues
(1) Partially Insufficient Warrant
Of course, if the basis for a search warrant is information
obtained illegally from the individual whose property or person is
sought to be seized, the warrant is invalid, and any evidence se-
cured through it must be suppressed. 2 "7 However, where prob-
able cause is shown in the warrant, independent of tainted or in-
complete evidence, the warrant is still valid.2T8
272. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); United States v.
McNally, 473 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Laws v. Yeager,
448 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1971); State v. Perry, 59 NJ. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971).
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1973).
273. United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 219 Pa. Super. 109, 280 A.2d 430 (1971).
274. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); United States v. Mc-
Nally, 473 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Kislin v. New
Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Su-
per. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973). Of course, it is not sufficient in itself to
show a present crime. Commonwealth v. Connor, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d
341 (1973); Commonwealth v. Emerich, 225 Pa. Super. 163, 310 A.2d 390
(1973); Commonwealth v. Suppa, 223 Pa. Super. 513, 302 A.2d 357 (1973).
275. United States ex rel. Henderson v. Mazurkiewiz, 443 F.2d 1135
(3d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950
(3d Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347
(1973) (presence in apartment); Commonwealth v. BUllock, 221 Pa. Super.
441, 289 A.2d 749 (1972) (receipt of package in mail).
276. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225
Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973).
277. Commonwealth v. Dembo, 451 Pa. 1, 301 A.2d 689 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Meadows, 222 Pa. Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365 (1972). Compare
the problem of the admissibility of confessions after illegal arrests,
searches, or prior confessions. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Rowe, 445 Pa. 454, 282 A.2d 319 (1971); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429
Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968).
278. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693 (1971); Corn-
The prior illegality, to invalidate the warrant, must relate to
the individual against whom the evidence is sought to be intro-
duced. Thus, information gained from an informant through pos-
sible violation of that informant's rights cannot eliminate the prob-
able cause basis against another defendant.2 9 He simply has no
standing to challenge such a violation.
8 0
(2) Disclosure of Informant
As indicated earlier, probable cause is to be determined by
the "four squares" of the warrant and, if permissible by local rules,
any additional testimony of the affiant before the magistrate.28 '
Factual inaccuracies not going to the integrity of the affidavit will
not destroy probable cause.28 2 Thus, even if there is later trial tes-
timony different than indicated in the warrant or even an acquit-
tal on the charge described in the warrant, there can still be prob-
able cause.
28 3
A defendant has ¢no right to secure the name of the infor-
mant.28 4 While, in Pennsylvania, he has a right to cross-examine
the affiant with respect to the prior results of a confidential infor-
mant,28 5 the only purpose is to test the credibility of the affiant. 28 6
Such a right of cross-examination does not include disclosure of
the identity of the informant, nor of specific enough information
that would cause the identity of the informant to be disclosed. 28 7
Only a showing that the information in the warrant is knowingly
false will invalidate the bases for probable cause and thus the
warrant.
28 8
(3) Staleness of Information
The information which gives rise to a determination of prob-
able cause must be closely related in time to the date the warrant
monwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972).
279. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 279 A.2d 26 (1971).
280. Commonwealth v. Williams, 219 Pa. Super. 109, 280 A.2d 430
(1971).
281. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Commonwealth v. Crawley,
209 Pa. Super. 70, 223 A.2d 885 (1966). See notes 12-14 and accompanying
text supra.
282. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
283. United States ex rel. Laws v. Yeager, 448 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Dial, 218 Pa. Super. 248, 276 A.2d 314 (1971), aff'd on
this issue, 445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971).
284. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967).
285. Compare Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973);
with State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972).
286. Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 341, 310 A.2d 347 (1973).
287. See Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 341, 310 A.2d 347
(1973).
288. Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A.2d 441 (1970).
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is issued. 28 9 Probable cause must be shown to presently exist not
merely what might have been a reasonable basis days ago. 290 Of
course, prior information may be updated by surveillance. 29 1
C. Execution of the Warrant
(1) Knock and Announce Rule
In order to assure the right of privacy, police officers must
give every opportunity to the occupant to voluntarily surrender
this right.292 While Pennsylvania law is unclear as to whether a
trick or ruse may be used for entry,29 3 ordinarily a third party may
not be used to secure entrance on a warrant without giving the oc-
cupant an opportunity to voluntarily respond to it. 29 4 After the
resident responds to knocking, the police may announce their pur-
pose, deliver the warrant, and commence their search.295 Before
forcibly entering a premises, they must knock, announce their iden-
tity and purpose, and wait a reasonable period of time for a re-
sponse. 296 There is no requirement that the police await the
arrival of the resident. A search may be conducted pursuant to
a valid warrant even in the known absence of the occupant.2 9 7
Exigent circumstances may eliminate the requirement for com-
pliance with the knock and announce rule298 :
(1) If the police have a reasonable belief that evidence will be
destroyed, they may enter immediately or as soon as that belief is
formed.299 The mere fact that a warrant is for lottery paper or
289. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 113, 281 A.2d 897 (1971).
290. Commonwealth v. Connor, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Bove, 221 Pa. Super. 345, 293 A.2d 67 (1972).
291. See Commonwealth v. Bove, 221 Pa. Super. 345, 293 A.2d 67
(1972).
292. Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 341, 310 A.2d 347 (1973).
293. Commonwealth v. Riccardi, 220 Pa. Super. 72, 283 A.2d 719
(1971).
294. Commonwealth v. Riccardi, 220 Pa. Super. 72, 283 A.2d 719
(1971); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271
(1970).
295. Commonwealth v. Billock, 221 Pa. Super. 441, 289 A.2d 749 (1972).
296. Commonwealth v. DeMichel. 442 Pa. 553, 277 A.2d 159 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968); Common-
wealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
297. United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973).
298. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301 (1958); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795
(1968).
299. Commonwealth v. McAleese, 214 Pa. Super. 228, 252 A.2d 380
(1969). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 223 Pa. Super. 83, 289 A.2d 733
(1972); Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119
(1972).
for drugs-which are easily disposable-does not eliminate the re-
quirement of waiting a reasonable time for a response.s00 How-
ever, actions observed or noises heard, such as a slammed door,301
a person running away,3 0 2 a lie about being alone,3 0 3 may justify
quick entry to avoid destruction of evidence.30 4
(2) If the police have a reasonable belief that strict compli-
ance with the requirements would cause peril or injury to them
or bystanders, they may dispense with the knock, announce and
wait rule. 0 5 Such a belief would be justified, for example, where
guns or explosives are known to be available.
3 00
(3) If the police are presented with facts making them rea-
sonably certain that the occupants know of their identity and pur-
pose, the knock, announce, and wait rule need not be complied
with.3 0 7  Such "useless gestures" would not be required where
there is a scream of "police" and running,308 where a door is
slammed after the badge and warrant are shown, 0 9 or where vis-
ual! observtiol'"nof thei urnifrmeor eas nnily identifiablea police- offi-
cers is made by the occupant and delay tactics are attempted.3 10
(2) Timing of Search
There is no requirement that a search warrant be executed
when occupants are present.311 Under local rules, a search war-
rant can be executed only in the day-time, unless justification for a
night-time search is included within the warrant and specific au-
thorization is given for such a nighttime search.
3 12
Once a warrant is obtained, it must be executed promptly. 313
Failure to do so makes the probable cause basis for the search
stale.3 14 Under Pennsylvania Rules, no warrant may be executed
more than two days after its issuance.3 15 Of course, the warrant
300. Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 442 Pa. 553, 277 A.2d 159 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Riccardi, 220 Pa. Super. 72, 283 A.2d 719 (1971).
301. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 223 Pa. Super. 107, 296 A.2d 848 (1972).
302. Commonwealth v. Dial, 445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa. Super. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973).
303. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 223 Pa. Super. 112, 296 A.2d 864 (1972).
304. See Commonwealth v. McAleese, 214 Pa. Super. 228, 252 A.2d 380
(1969).
305. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 223 Pa. Super. 83, 289 A.2d 733
(1972).
306. United States v. Mendez, 437 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1971).
307. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 223 Pa. Super. 107, 296 A.2d 848
(1972); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 223 Pa. Super. 83, 289 A.2d 733 (1972).
308. United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971).
309. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 223 Pa. Super. 107, 296 A.2d 848 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 223 Pa. Super. 83, 289 A.2d 733 (1972).
310. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 223 Pa. Super. 112., 296 A.2d 864 (1972).
311. United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973).
312. PA. R. CPiM. P. 2003(c). See United States ex rel. Boyance v.
Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968).
313. Commonwealth v. McCants, 450 Pa. 245, 299 A.2d 283 (1973).
314. Id.
315. PA. R. Cam. P. 2005.
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may still be found stale within that period. Proper reasons must
be given for delay.
316
(3) Scope of Search
In addition to the requirements established by the "specificity
of description of items to be seized" standard discussed earlier, 17
other rules apply to "plain view" seizure during execution of a
warrant. Police may seize contraband, weapons, or items danger-
ous in themselves, 8 18 provided that these items, are discovered in
a place where it is reasonable to assume that such an item could be
found.319 Of course, once the items named in the warrant are
obtained, the police cannot continue with a now "exploratory
search" in the hope of finding such items.
20
X. EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRAiT REQUIREMENT
As indicated earlier, 21 a search and seizure warrant is generally
necessary to search a premises, person or item. However, because
of the needs of society and a common-sense reading of the Constitu-
tion, there have been exceptions to that rule for searches by con-
sent, searches in an emergency, seizures of items in plain view,
searches incident to an arrest, stops and frisks and stops and
searches of automobiles.
A. Consent Searches
If one voluntarily consents to a search, there is no need for a
warrant.8 22 Of course, the police cannot claim a consent if a defen-
dant peaceably complies with a search warrant which later turns
out to have been invalid.
8 23
Consent may be implied from the defendant's formal agree-
ment, 24 oral agreement,8 2 or actions.8 26 If specific words or deeds
316. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
317. See notes 237-43 and accompanying text supra.
318. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Anglin v. Direc-
tor, Paxtuxent Inst., 439 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1971).
319. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
320. United States v. Lazar, 347 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
321. See note 221 supra.
322. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Fox, 445 Pa. 76, 282 A.2d 341 (1971).
323. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United States ex
rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967).
324. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972).
325. United States v. Genareo, 467 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972) ("here is what
you want").
by an individual clearly indicate an intention to allow a search and
seizure, the police may assume there is consent and commence their
work.
3 2 7
Of course, a consent must be voluntary and not secured through
coercion or duress.328 As with a confession, all the circumstances
of the relinquishment by the individual are to be considered in de-
termining voluntariness. 29 The fact that the police conceal their
intentions does not indicate coercion or duress. 30 The mere fact
that a person is confronted by police, is "in custody," is being ques-
tioned, or is "under arrest" does not preclude a valid consensual
search.3 31 Of course, confrontation by large numbers of police, with
guns drawn, and a statement reasonably understood to be a de-
mand rather than a request, can indicate coercion or duress and
invalidate an acquiescence to a search.
3 2
There is no requirement that a defendant be advised that he
has a right not to consent,3 33 nor that a warrant could or couldn't,
would or wouldn't be obtained.3 3 4 Moreover, there is no require-
ment that a defendant be given his "Miranda warnings" before a
consent is sought.335 Of course, such warnings followed by acqui-
escence are a good indication of a voluntary consent. 336 However,
if a defendant invokes his right to silence, "consent" derived from
questioning thereafter is not voluntary.
33 7
A voluntary consent may be gotten prospectively, as for ex-
326. United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972) (indicating
bag to police officer); United States v. Gaines, 441 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971)
(pointing); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505
(1972) (ouens trunk).
327. United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972).
328. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972).
329. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v.
Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa.
249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d
290 (1969).
330. Brown v. Brierley, 438 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970).
331. United States ex rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir.
1970) (arrest); Commonwealth v. Fox, 445 Pa. 76, 282 A.2d 341 (1971)
(questioning); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 275 A.2d 46 (1971)
(police questioning).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 357 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
333. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States ex
rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1970).
334. United States v. Curiale, 414 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Morgan, 306 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Cal. 1969).
335. United States ex ret. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir.
1970); Commonwealth v. Fox, 445 Pa. 76, 282 A.2d 341 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 275 A.2d 46 (1971); Commonwealth v. An-
derson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 222 A.2d 495 (1966).
336. Commonwealth v. Fox, 445 Pa. 76, 282 A.2d 341 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970). See Schneckloth v. Bust-
amonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
337. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ample, where it is required in order to receive a state license. 3 8
But the "statutory consent" must be clear as to scope and if there is
an option of refusal, that option must be included.
339
Any person who has the right to control and use of a premises
or object may consent to a search even though a joint possessor or
user later challenges the consent.3 40 Thus, for example, a co-tenant
or co-owner, mother, wife or roommate may consent to a search
of a defendant's premisesA41 Of course, if an individual has clear
exclusive control of a specific locus or container, another may not
consent to a search of those items over which he has no authority
to exercise control.3 42 If the private citizen turns the defendant's
property over to the police, the seizure is lawful as there has been
no deprivation by the state of a defendant's rights.3 43 Similarly,
where there has been a clear abandonment of property or premises,
the possessor, landlord, hotel owner or mortgage company may
consent to the search, even if the contract to lease, hire or buy has




As probable cause and warrant requirements must be read in
a common-sense and practical manner, certain fact situations indi-
cating an emergency need for a prompt search and seizure justify
warrantless searches.3 4 6 Thus, for example, where delay in secur-
ing a warrant would cause the loss or destruction of evidence, a
338. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475
(1973).
339. See Commonwealth v. Wolrert, 224 Pa. Super. 361, 308 A.2d 120
(1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475 (1973).
340. United States v. Matlock, U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 98& (1974); United
States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Kontos,
442 Pa. 343, 276 A.2d 830 (1971). "
341. United States ex rel. McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Cabey v. Rundle, 432 Pa. 466, 248 A.2d
197 (1968); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 225 Pa. Super. 208, 310 A.2d 406
(1973); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 202 Pa. Super. 360, 195 A.2d 817
(1963).
342. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Commonwealth v. Storck,
442 Pa. 197, 275 A.2d 362 (1971).
343. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Ross, 452 Pa. 500, 307 A.2d 898 (1973).
344. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Fields,
458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203
A.2d 782 (1964).
345. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271
(1970).
346. Compare Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) and United States
v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972), with Commonwealth v. Linde,
448 Pa. 230, 293 A.2d 62 (1972).
warrantless search would be lawful.3 47 Similarly, when police are
seeking a fleeing felon, they may make warrantless entries, based
on a probable cause to believe the individual is in a particular loca-
tion.3 4 8 If police believe that there is danger to themselves, or third
persons, they may enter premises without a warrant.3
4 9
Certain "emergency exceptions" to the requirement of warrants
and even probable cause have been established by law. Thus, for
example, federal officials have the right to make warrantless
searches of automobiles and other vehicles near the boundaries of
the United States. 10 Police in Pennsylvania are authorized to stop
any vehicle at any time.35 1 As these provisions are in sharp con-
flict with right of privacy established by the Fourth Amendment,
they must be limited in scope and narrowly construed.352 Similarly,
certain public dangers such as hijacking, allow warrantless stops
and searches of persons.35 3 In addition, certain health or safety
needs justify warrantless searches, sometimes even without proba-
ble cause.
3 54
Administrative needs to deter and investigate crime also cre-
ate an emergency exception. Thus, police may make a warrant-
less search of the entire crime scene for evidence. 5
C. Plain View Searches
Where police are justifiably in a place and see items that can
be seized, they may seize them without a warrant. 56 In such situ-
ations, there is no search, as the items are in plain view.3 57 How-
ever, police must have probable cause at the time of the "plain
view" to believe that the items consitute contraband, stolen prop-
347. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770 (1966); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States ex Tel. McNeil v. Rundle, 325 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
348. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
349. See United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972).
350. See Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1965).
351. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1221(d) (1971).
352. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border
searches); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
353. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
354. Compare United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), with Cam-
ara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
355. Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973); State v.
Vader, 114 N.J. Super. 260, 276 A.2d 151 (1971); State v. Oakes, 129
Vt. 241, 276 A.2d 18 (1971). See United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273
(6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
356. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
Edgar v. United States, 377 U.S. 970 (1964); Commonwealth v. Davenport
453 Pa. 235, 308 A.2d 85 (1973); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 217 Pa. Super.
332, 272 A.2d 21 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Bowers v. Rundle, 200
Pa. Super. 496, 189 A.2d 910 (1973).
357. See United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Rota, 222 Pa. Super. 163, 292 A.2d 496 (1972).
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erty, weapons, or evidence of a crime.
3 8
The items must be in open view or else come into view during
the course of an independent lawful stop, search, or investigation
for other items or an individual.3 9 Thus, items observed during
a warrantless emergency entry into premises 6 ° or as a result of
a probable cause arrest 361 of a defendant may be lawfully seized.
Of course, items abandoned by an individual are no longer in his
possession and observation of such items is not an invasion of that
individual's right to privacy
62
Plain view must be inadvertent. 363 There must be a lawful
reason to be in the place to view the items. 364 Thus, abandonment
coerced by unlawful police actions may not be used as a basis
to uphold seizure of evidence.3 6 Thus, for example, a routine
police stop of an automobile will not be a justifiable basis for seizure
of evidence that came into plain view or was abandoned as a
result of that stop.3 6 6 However, a stop of a vehicle because of
specific violations of the motor vehicle or criminal code would be
proper and the seizure of evidence that came into plain view as
a result of that stop would be lawful.
3 67
Plain view does not hibernate at sunset. Police may properly
use lights or a flashlight once properly in a place where he can
observe. Evidence seen as a result of increased vision from that
light is still in plain view and may be seized.3 6
D. Searches Incident to an Arrest
When police lawfully make an arrest, they may make a search
incident to and contemporaneous with that arrest.3 69 A lawful ar-
358. Commonwealth v. Bowers, 217 Pa. Super. 317, 274 A.2d 546
(1970).
359. See United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1971); Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 277 A.2d 807 (1971).
360. United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972).
361. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235, 308 A.2d 85 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Rota, 222 Pa. Super. 163, 292 A.2d 496 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972).
362. Commonwealth v. Tatro, 223 Pa. Super. 278, 297 A.2d 139 (1972).
363. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
364. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235, 308 A.2d 85 (1973).
365. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973).
366. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
367. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505
(1972); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 222 Pa. Super. 335, 295 A.2d 90 (1972).
368. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 226 Pa. Super. 79, 310 A.2d 323 (1973).
See Williams v. United States, 404 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1968).
369. See Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 277 A.2d 807 (1971).
rest must be based on probable cause3 7 0 and in certain situations
must be made with an arrest warrant. Even if a search warrant or
arrest warrant was invalid, however, the police may still have in-
dependent probable cause to arrest and they may make a valid
search incidental to such a probable cause arrest.3
7 1
(1) Misdemeanor-Felony Distinctions
Police may arrest a defendant without a warrant and conduct
an incidental and contemporaneous search 312 whenever they have a
reasonable belief that' a felony has been or is being commit-
ted.373 Similarly, the police may arrest a misdemeanant, without a
warrant, whenever they have a reasonable belief that the offense
is being committed in their presence.174 No arrest warrant is re-
quired unless it is for a misdemeanor not committed in the offi-
cer's presence.
3 75
When a misdemeanor is not committed in the officer's pres-
ence, an arrest warrant must be obtained.376 While police officers
may arrest a felon after hot pursuit into a neighboring jurisdiction,
they may not pursue and arrest a misdemeanant, whether with or
without a warrant.3 77 Such defendants can only be arrested, as with
felons not arrested in hot pursuit, by police officers of the jurisdic-
tion to which the defendant has fled and the defendants may be re-
turned to the local jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of in-
terstate extradition or intrastate transfer. 78
(2) Probable Cause to Arrest
As indicated earlier,3 79 the standards to determine probable
370. See In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 A.2d 213 (1973).
371. Chrisman v. Field, 448 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Hughes, 219 Pa. Super. 181, 280 A.2d 556 (1971).
372. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ("incident to an ar-
rest"); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) ("contemporaneous with
an arrest").
373. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 Pa. 213 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Friel, 211 Pa. Super. 11, 234 A.2d 22 (1967); PA. R. CalM. P.
101(2).
374. Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 212 Pa. Super. 167, 240 A.2d 570
(1968); Commonwealth v. Garrick, 210 Pa. Super. 124, 232 A.2d 8 (1967);
PA. R. CRIM. P. 101(3).
375. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 A.2d 213 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405, 282 A.2d 375 (1971); Commonwealth
ex rel. Whiting v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 17, 198 A.2d 568 (1969). What is "in
the officer's presence" depends on what he observes on view and does
not include statements received, even from a defendant. See Common-
wealth v. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. 19, 311 A.2d 666 (1973).
376. Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. 51, 297 A.2d 142 (1972).
377. Commonwealth v. Troutman, 223 Pa. Super. 509, 302 A.2d 430
(1973).
378. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 191.1 et
seq. (1969) (extradition). See PA. R. CalM. P. 123 (intrastate rendition).
379. See notes 245-46 and accompanying text supra.
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cause to arrest are the same as the standards to determine probable
cause for a search warrant.3 0 However, the probable cause to ar-
rest need only relate to a basis for believing that a criminal of-
fense has been or is being committed.31 Of course, information re-
lated to the possession of contraband or weapons indicates the
existence of such a criminal offense.38 2 As with a search war-
rant,38 3 only a probability and not a prima facie showing of crimi-
nal activity is required. 3 4 If the officer has personal knowledge or
reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient to warrant a man
of reasonable caution, that an individual has committed or is com-
mitting an offense, he may arrest him.3 5 When evaluating this
"reasonable basis", the measure is what is sufficient in light of the
special skill and training of the police officer.
38 0
Unlike search warrants, which are usually based on collected
pieces of information from numerous informants, arrests are usu-
ally based on personal observation of the police officers. 38 7 Such
personal observation can, of course, be sufficient to make out prob-
able cause.38 8 Of course, mere surmise or hunch of a criminal of-
fense is insufficient. 38 9 Even a reasonable suspicion will allow only
a pat-down or stop and frisk.38 0 In order to indicate probable cause,
the police officer's observations must indicate the existence of a
380. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969); Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 306, 309
A.2d 412 (1973).
381. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Commonwealth
v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
382. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (gun); Com-
monwealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d 785 (1972) (narcotics);
Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
383. See note 248 and accompanying text supra.
384. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 A.2d 213 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Anderson, 224 Pa. Super. 19, 302 A.2d 504 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
385. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Commonwealth
v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
386. See Commonwealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d 785
(1972).
387. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d
785 (1972); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 222 Pa. Super. 335, 295 A.2d 90
(1972); Commonwealth v. Browne, 221 Pa. Super. 368, 292 A.2d 487 (1972).
388. Commonwealth v. Young, 222 Pa. Super. 355, 294 A.2d 785 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Beatty, 216 Pa. Super. 144, 264 A.2d 184 (1970).
389. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Ceravolo, 224 Pa. Super. 464, 307 A.2d 288 (1973)
("might be narcotics"); In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93
(1972); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 222 Pa. Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365
(1972).
390. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Commonwealth v. Hicks,
434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969). Cf. Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa.
338, 263 A.2d 342 (1970).
crime or contraband and a particular person's tie to that crime or
contraband.3 91 Thus, prior criminal activities by an individual are
insufficient to justify probable cause that he is committing a crime
now or has recently committed an unsolved crime.3 92  Similarly,
flight or concealment from a police officer is insufficient to alone
justify an arrest, 93 although, together with other facts, it may be
sufficient.
3 4
When an "arrest" occurs, authorizing an incidental search, is a
legal question and does not depend on whether an officer informs
the accused of his intention to make an arrest, the cause thereof, or
the exact charge.393 Nor does it depend on whether an officer be-
lieves that he is making an arrest or that he is making an arrest
for a particular crime. "96 The subjective state of mind of the offi-
cer is irrelevant. When and if a lawful arrest occurs must be de-
termined by the court from the facts and circumstances.
3 97
While lawful arrest cannot be a mere sham, done solely to se-
cure an incidental soarch, 398 the mere fact that there is no arrest on
the original charge for which there was an incidental search, or that
there was a later acquittal, or that a more serious charge is prose-
cuted, does not mean that there was not probable cause to arrest
at the time of the original arrest, affording a proper basis for an in-
cidental search.
399
Probable cause to arrest may be based not only on personal
observation but, like a warrant, may be based on circumstantial
evidence,40 0 official records, 401 statements of victims and eyewit-
nesses, 40 2 information obtained from named and unnamed inform-
391. Commonwealth v. Browne, 221 Pa. Super. 368, 292 A.2d 487
(1972); Commonwealth v. Howell, 213 Pa. Super. 33, 245 A.2d 680 (1968).
392. See Commonwealth v. Connor, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Suppa, 223 Pa. Super. 513, 302 A.2d 357 (1973).
393. Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 301 A.2d 695 (1973).
394. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 222 Pa. Super. 335, 295 A.2d 90
(1972).
395. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Commonwealth v. White,
447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); Commonwealth v. Negri, 414 Pa. 21, 198
A.2d 595 (1964).
396. Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972).
397. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); United States v. Hobby, 275
A.2d 235 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
398. United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F.2d 232 (3d Cir.
1971). See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 222 Pa. Super. 178, 293 A.2d 84
(1972).
399. Commonwealth v. Macek, 218 Pa. Super. 124, 279 A.2d 772 (1971).
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Commonwealth v. Spriggs,
224 Pa. Super. 76, 302 A.2d 442 (1973).
400. Commonwealth v. DeFleminque, 450 Pa. 163, 299 A.2d 246 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Browne, 221 Pa. Super. 368, 292 A.2d 487 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Howell, 213 Pa. Super. 33, 245 A.2d 680 (1968).
401. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 222 Pa. Super. 335, 295 A.2d 90 (1972)
(stolen car check).
402. Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 304 A.2d 684 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).
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ants,40 3 or a combination of these sources. 404 Of course, in evalu-
ating the basis for an arrest, the collective information of the police
is to be considered-not only the arresting officer's information.4°5
If information comes from eyewitnesses or victims, a statement
of an offense together with a description specific enough to make
an identification are all that is required. 406 If information is derived
from other informants, the hearsay may be considered as a basis
for an arrest if: (1) there is sufficient basis to believe the inform-
ant's facts show a crime was committed or is being committed and
that a particular person is the perpetrator; 7 and (2) there is a
sufficient basis to believe that the particular informant is credible
or that his information is reliable.
408 Like a search warrant,
40 9
the conclusion of criminal activity may be based on the inform-
ant's personal observation,410 the informant's circumstantial facts
description, 411 or the informant's receipt of statements made by
perpetrators to him. 412 Again, like a search warrant,413 the credi-
bility of the informant may be shown by naming the informant and
his reputation, status in the community, prior relationship to the
police,414 or inculpatory admission to the police.4 15 The credibility
of a confidential informant can be shown by his previous reliabil-
403. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d
237 (1972).
404. See Commonwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 447 Pa. 21, 288 A.2d 757 (1972).
405. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 113, 299 Pa. 213 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d 794 (1972).
406. See Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 449 Pa. 35, 296 A.2d 519 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 447 Pa. 21, 288 A.2d 757 (1972).
407. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Commonwealth
v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Massie,
221 Pa. Super. 453, 292 A.2d 508 (1972) (no facts to show basis for belief
in crime); Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 326, 309 A.2d 413 (1973) (in-
formant "found out").
408. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959). See In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973)
(anonymous tip insufficient); Commonwealth v. Massie, 221 Pa. Super. 453,
292 A.2d 508 (1972) (no showing of credibility).
409. See notes 259-64 and accompanying text supra.
410. Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).
411. See Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237
(1972).
412. Commonwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973).
413. See notes 265-76 and accompanying text supra.
414. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 304 A.2d 684 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).
415. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d 794 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 279 A.2d 26 (1971).
ity 416 or admission against penal interest. 417 The reliability of
the information can be shown by the specificity of the informant's
information,418 surveillance, 419 reputation or past activities of the
perpetrator, 420 or official records. 421 And, of course, credibility of
the informant and reliability of the information can be shown by a
combination of facts relating to the informant or corroboration of
his information.
422
(3) Timing of Search
A search incident to an arrest must be contemporaneous with
that arrest.4 23 Thus, when a defendant is arrested, a search of his
person or the immediate vicinity must take place immediately.
424
Similarly, if an unlawful act occurs but the accused is not arrested
until days or weeks later, a search between the act and the arrest is
not incident to the arrest and is unlawful.
425
Police may, however, as part of their "booking or slating," make
the initial search or even a more complete search of ti.le dueft u,.
or his effects when he is taken into police headquarters. 4 26
Similarly, if there is a question of the health of the defendant,
police may wait until the defendant receives medical attention and
search him or his effects at a hospital. 27 But there must be
altruistic motives428 and a true arrest.
29
416. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Commonwealth v. Dial,
445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971).
417. Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972).
418. Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa. Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237
(1972). See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
419. United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 219 Pa. Super. 109, 280 A.2d 430 (1971).
420. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
421. Commonwealth v. Frisby, 451 Pa. 16, 301 A.2d 610 (1973) (hand-
writing comparison).
422. Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Mitchell, 222 Pa. Super. 335, 295 A.2d 90 (1972). See Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
423. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Stoner v. Cal-
ifornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1963); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 218
A.2d 249 (1964); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 218 Pa. Super. 49, 269 A.2d
332 (1970).
424. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Commonwealth v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230, 293
A.2d 62 (1972).
425. Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 271 A.2d 500 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa. Super. 361, 308 A.2d 120 (1973).
426. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States v. Frank-
enberry, 387 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Querubin, 211 Pa.
Super. 360, 236 A.2d 538 (1967).
427. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325 (1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 937 (1969).
428. See Commonwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa. Super. 361, 308 A.2d 120
(1973).
429. See Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969); Common-
wealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 271 A.2d 500 (1970).
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Of course, when an arrest authorizing an incidental search oc-
curs is a legal question and must be determined by the courts from
the facts and circumstances.
4 30
(4) Scope of the Search
The permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest de-
pends upon the nature of the offense, the nature of the arrest, and
the circumstances of the arrest.
Where an arrest is made for minor offenses which do not in-
volve unlawful possession of contraband or violent or dangerous
conduct, a full search may not be made. Rather, the only search
that can be made is a protective search for weapons (stop and frisk)
to protect the safety of the officers. 431 Similarly, a non-custodial stop
for a traffic violation does not even justify a pat-down, let alone a
full search, unless reasonable suspicions are aroused, justifying a
frisk, or probable cause is evident, justifying an arrest for a more
serious offense and an incidental search.
43 2
Where there is probable cause for an arrest, but no formal
arrest, a full search may also not be justified. The scope of the
search depends on the likelihood that the individual arrested would
destroy evidence or endanger the police.
433
Ordinarily, however, an arrest will justify an incidental search
of the defendant and the area into which he might reasonably reach
to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. 43 4 If a woman is involved
in an arrest, her person includes her pocketbook and it may be
searched.
435
Not everyone at the scene of an arrest (or search) may be
searched.430 However, if the police reasonably believe that a de-
fendant or his companions are armed or dangerous, they may frisk
430. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
431. Commonwealth v. Freeman, 222 Pa. Super. 179, 293 A.2d 84
(1972).
432. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 133, 299 A.2d 207 (1973). See
Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
433. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
434. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 224 Pa. Super. 76,
302 A.2d 442 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Ceravolo, 224 Pa. Super. 464,
307 A.2d 288 (1973).
435. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 219 Pa. Super. 181, 280 A.2d 556
(1971). See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505
(1972).
436. Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. Bourke, 218 Pa. Super. 320, 280 A.2d 425 (1971).
both the defendant and the companions to assure their own
safety.
437
Of course, if police are lawfully making an arrest, they may
seize evidence, contraband or weapons that come into plain view.
43 8
E. Stops and Frisks
As indicated above, with certain minor offenses or traffic viola-
tions, police have a right to make a protective "pat-down" of indi-
viduals. 439  Similarly, police have a right to frisk bystanders dur-
ing an arrest or search.
440
Independent of these rules, where police have a reasonable sus-
picion that (1) criminal activity is afoot and (2) that the suspect is
armed and dangerous, they may temporarily stop that suspect and
pat him down for weapons, in order to insure their safety and
the safety of third persons.
441
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is less than probable
cause.442 Nevertheless, it is more than a "sixth sense" instinct.
The specific facts must show that there is a basis for a belief that
criminal activity is afoot and that the individuals frisked are tied to
that activity.443  Thus, an offense followed by a general descrip-
tion of the perpetrators might not justify a frisk; an offense fol-
lowed by a more specific description will.
444
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity will only justify a
pat-down if accompanied by a belief that the suspect is armed or
dangerous. 44 5 Thus, suspicion of a burglary might not justify a
frisk.446  Suspicion of possession of a weapon will.4 4 7  Suspicion
of robbery, not mere burglary, must be assumed, then, to indicate
that individuals allegedly involved were dangerous.
448
437. Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970); See
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972).
438. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235, 308 A.2d 85
(1973); Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 277 A.2d 807 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972).
439. See notes 431-32 and accompanying text supra.
440, See notes 436-37 and accompanying text supra.
441. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
442. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505
(1972); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 219 Pa. Super. 340, 280 A.2d 662 (1971).
443. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); In re Harvey, 222
Pa. Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 222 Pa.
Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365 (1972).
444. Compare Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A.2d 342
(1970), with Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 449 Pa. 35, 296 A.2d 519 (1972),
and Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 447 Pa. 21, 288 A.2d 757 (1972).
445. Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 301 A.2d 695 (1973); In re
Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972); Commonwealth v. Mead-
ows, 222 Pa. Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365 (1972).
446. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 222 Pa. Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365
(1972).
447. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Commonwealth v. Wat-
kins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505 (1972).
448. United States ex Tel. Richardson v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860 (1972).
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If as as result of a proper frisk, weapons are felt, the defendant
may be searched, arrested and the evidence seized.449 A more ex-
tensive search is then justified as incident to the arrest.
45 0
Whether a case, other than a minor or traffic violation, falls
into the "stop and frisk" or "incident to the arrest" exception de-
pends on the facts of the case. Thus, some descriptions of perpe-
trators might equal "reasonable suspicion" and others "probable
cause." 45 ' The difference is important. Probable cause to arrest or-
dinarily justifies a complete search of the person, whether or not he
is believed to be armed.4 2 Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
justifies a limited pat-down only if there is also a belief that the
suspect is armed or dangerous.
453
F. Stops and Searches of Automobiles
The validity and scope of an automobile search depends on the
basis for a search. As in any other situation, a search warrant
should be obtained. However, given a valid exception, and consid-
ering the problem of a mobile vehicle, automobiles may be searched
without a warrant.
(1) Traffic Stop
In Pennsylvania at least, although "routine" traffic stops for
checking of license and registration are authorized by statute,
454
evidence viewed, obtained or seized as a result of such stops is
inadmissible.455 There must be specific facts justifying an intru-
sion into the right of privacy. Such stops will only authorize the
use of evidence derived from them if the police officer has probable
cause, based on specific facts, which indicate to him that either
the vehicle or the driver are in violation of the motor vehicle
code.45 6 Where there is information furnishing a reasonable basis
449. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States ex rel. Richard-
son v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1972).
450. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 224 Pa. Super. 76, 302 A.2d 442 (1973).
See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 76 (1969).
451. Compare Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 447 Pa. 21, 288 A.2d 757
(1972), with Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 449 Pa. 35, 296 A.2d 519 (1972).
452. See notes 434-35 and accompanying text supra.
453. Commonwealth v. Vassiljev, 218 Pa. Super. 215, 275 A.2d 852
(1971).
454. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 1221(d) (1970).
455. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). But
see State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); State v. Boone,
114 N.J. Super. 521, 277 A.2d 414 (1971).
456. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973);
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 226 Pa. Super. 29, 310 A.2d 323 (1973).
for a belief that a violation has occurred, there may be a stop.4 57
If such a stop is validly made, anything in plain view which is evi-
dence of a crime, a weapon, or contraband, may be seized. Since
plain view does not hibernate at night, police may use their flash-
light to view those in the car and the car itself.45 8
The United States Supreme Court has recently held45 9 that an
arrest for a motor vehicle violation or offense, that involves taking
an individual into custody, however limited, allows a complete
search of the violator and seizure of any evidence of a crime,
weapons, or contraband.
However, Pennsylvania cases have held that, even after a mo-
tor vehicle violation stop, unless specific facts and circumstances
indicate that the driver or passengers are armed and dangerous,
there is no basis to require the passenger to leave the car and to
frisk them, let alone make a full search.4 6 0 Of course, specific facts
indicating possession of a weapon would justify such a pat-down.46 1
A traffic stop alone will not justify the seizure of a car or a
search of it unless the police have reason to believe that a felony
has been committed by the occupant of the car; that the car is being
used in the furtherance of a felony; that evidence of a crime is in
the car; or that weapons are in the car and easily accessible to the
occupant.
46 2
(2) Arrests in Automobiles
When police, with probable cause, effectuate the arrest of a de-
fendant in a car, they may make a limited search without a warrant
of the car incident to the defendant's arrest. 463 This search, as with
all searches incident to an arrest, extends only to the areas within
the immediate access of the defendant. 464 However, where specific
facts indicate the presence of evidence, contraband or weapons in
the trunk or hidden in the car, a more thorough search of the car,
including the trunk, may be made.46 5
If, after arrest of a defendant, his car is taken into custody
457. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 226 Pa. Super. 29, 310 A.2d 323 (1973).
458. Id.
459. United States v. Robinson, U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 466 (1973); Gustaf-
son v. Florida, U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973); Commonwealth v. DeJesus,
226 Pa. Super. 29, 310 A.2d 323 (1973). Whether the arrest is "custodial" or
not would appear to depend solely on whether or not the police officer de-
cides to remove the violator from the scene.
460. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 133, 299 A.2d 207 (1973).
461. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
462. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Dussell, 439 Pa. 392, 266 A.2d 659 (1970).
463. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v.
Menke, 468 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1,
304 A.2d 456 (1973).
464. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973).
465. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Commonwealth v.
DeFleminque, 450 Pa. 163, 299 A.2d 246 (1973).
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or control by the police, the car may be searched then. If a search
of the vehicle incident to an arrest could lawfully be conducted
on the highway, but would be dangerous or difficult if so con-
ducted, the vehicle may be moved and searched at the police sta-
tion instead.466 Of course, such a warrantless search is only au-
thorized if made after arrest of a defendant, in or near his car.
4 67
(3) Mobility Doctrine
Because cars are mobile, the opportunity for a search is fleet-
ing.4 '6 Thus if there is independent probable cause to believe
that an automobile contains contraband, stolen goods, or is an
instrumentality of a crime, the car may be searched without a war-
rant, and either the car itself or evidence in it may be seized.46 9
However, where it is clear that this mobility is not present
and that there is no possibility that a defendant, or others, would
have access to the vehicle, there is no danger that the evidence
might be destroyed or lost and a search warrant is required to
search the car, absent any other justification such a search inci-
dent to an arrest.
470
Of course, the "mobility doctrine" eliminates only the need for a
warrant; it does not eliminate the need for probable cause.
471 If
there is an independent statutory right to stop, search or seize a
vehicle, such as a border search or inventory of an impounded
car, the seizure of evidence in the car is lawful.
47 2
G. Search by Private Citizens
Neither the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, nor Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pre-
scribe exclusion of evidence because of unreasonable searches and
seizures by private persons. Unless the person searching and
466. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973).
467. See Commonwealth v. Heard, 451 Pa. 125, 301 A.2d 870 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230, 293 A.2d 62 (1972).
468. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); United States ex
rel. McNeil v. Rundle, 325 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
469. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
470. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230, 293 A.2d 62 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ceravolo,
224 Pa. Super. 464, 307 A.2d 288 (1973).
471. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
472. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States
v. West, 453 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1972).
seizing is, in fact, a conduit of the police, there is no public inva-
sion of privacy and thus the exclusionary rules do not apply.
4 3
Of course, while warrantless searches may be undertaken by





Prior to 1967, the issue of identification or misidentification was
one of fact, to be determined by the trier of fact at trial. 475 There
was no requirement that counsel be present at any out of court
identification, nor that a separate hearing be held to determine
the fairness of the identification.4 16  The conduct of the out-of-
court identification, the nature of the identification, and the ability
of the witness to make an identification were all questions of weight
arnd n, t -lu-" - -"'"-- 4.
In United States v. Wade,4 78 the United States Supreme Court
held that an accused is entitled to counsel at a formal lineup iden-
tification conducted after indictment. In addition, the Court held
in Wade and companion cases 47 0 that no identification obtained by
a procedure which is "impermissibly suggestive," may be admit-
ted. 8 0 Finally, the Court held that any out-of-court identification,
made without the presence of counsel, or a knowing and effec-
tive waiver of the right, or made in an impermissibly suggestive at-
mosphere would be excluded at trial. If such out-of-court identifi-
cation were excluded, an in-court identification would also be in-
admissible unless it could be shown that it is based on a source
independent of the out-of-court identification and therefore not
tainted by it.
48 1
473. PA. R. Cim . P. 2004.
474. Id.
475. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820
(1954); Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 138 Pa. Super. 156, 10 A.2d 120 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Ricci, 161 Pa. Super. 193, 54 A.2d 51 (1947). See Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382 (1968); United States ex Tel.
Choice v. Brierley, 460 F.2d 68, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1972).
476. See Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 962, 86 S. Ct. 444 (1965).
477. Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 423-26, 106 A.2d 820, 826-27
(1954); Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 138 Pa. Super. 156, 158, 10 A.2d 120, 121
(1939). They are still questions for the jury, even after an identification
has been ruled admissible. See Commonwealth v. Hickman, 453 Pa. 427,
309 A.2d 564 (1973); Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246
(1972).
478. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
479. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967).
480. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
481. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); see Common-
wealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 332, 275 A,2d 299, 301 (1971),
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In order to effectuate this exclusionary rule, a defendant
would be entitled to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, similar to
that held to determine the admissibility of evidence derived from
a search and seizure or interrogation. 48 2 At that hearing, the court
has to determine whether defendant was entitled to counsel and,
if so, whether that right was effectuated, either by waiver or by
an attorney's presence. In addition, the judge must determine
whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.
Both tests must be satisfied before an out-of-court identification is
admissible. 4 3 Finally, the hearing judge must determine the ad-
missibility of the in-court identification. The admission of the
in-court identification without first determining that it was not
tainted by the illegal out-of-court identification is constitutional
error.
484
The right to have counsel present at an identification proce-
dure is not retroactive. The right to a fair identification procedure
is. For any identification requiring counsel conducted after June
12, 1967, the prosecution cannot introduce any evidence of a wit-
ness's identification unless it can show either that the defendant
was informed of his sixth amendment right to have counsel pres-
ent and waived that right, or that counsel was present. For any
identification before or after June 12, 1967, the prosecution cannot
introduce any evidence of a witness's identification when that iden-




A. Right to a Lineup or Not to Participate
Lineups are preferred to other identification techniques but
they are not required.480 An identification conducted between a
witness and the accused, singly and not part of a lineup, is of
doubtful validity.487 However, there are exceptions, such as acci-
482. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 323; Commonwealth v. McMillion, 215 Pa.
Super. 306, 265 A.2d 375 (1969).
483. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) and United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
484. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
485. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
486. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972); Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
United States v. Hunt, 476 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v.
Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971); cf. Commonwealth v. Mackey,
447 Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 778 (1972).
487. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967); Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1237
dental,488 on-the-scene, 49 or emergency situations 490 which justify
a one-on-one identification procedure. And certainly, a photo-
graphic identification 491 or an in-court identification at trial492 is
valid without any prior lineup.
A defendant has no right to refuse to participate in a lineup,
to speak words, or to wear certain clothing.49 3 Refusal to partici-
pate can result in the defendant being held in criminal con-
tempt,4 9 4 and can be introduced as evidence and commented upon
at trial.4 95 While there must be reasonable cause to put one in a
lineup who is not in custody,4 96 there is no constitutional require-
ment for such cause to place one already legally in custody on
other charges in to a lineup.4 97 Of course, singling out one partici-
pant in a lineup for certain actions, words or clothing may be suffi-
cient to show that the identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive and thus render the identification inadmissible.
498
B. Right to Counsel
United States v. Wade held that a defendant is entitled to
counsel at any critical stage of a criminal case and that a lineup
identification is such a critical stage.4 99  The decision suggested
to some that this right to counsel attached at any lineup.
59 0 It sug-
(D.C. Cir. 1968). See Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266
A.2d 738 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352
(1970).
488. See, e.g., United States v. Furtney, 454 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283 A.2d 707 (1971).
489. United States v. Savage, 470 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1971); Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283
A.2d 707 (1971); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269
A.2d 352 (1970).
490. Compare Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) with Common-
wealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970). See also McRae v.
United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (no showing of in extremis
situation).
491. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
492. United States v. Dorantes, 472 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Hill, 449 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Jennings,
446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971).
493. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d
Cir. 1971).
494. United States v. Hammond, 419 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1969).
495. United States v. Parhms, 424 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1970); Higgins v.
Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Ginardi, 111 N.J. Super.
435, 268 A.2d 534 (1970).
496. Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1971); Wise v. Mur-
phy, 275 A.2d 203 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). See Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp.
899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
497. United States v. Jones, 403 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1968); Rigney v.
Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966).
498. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). See Butcher v. Rizzo,
317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
499. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
500. Id. at 231-32.
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gested to others that it applied in its limited fact situation-only
to post-indictment lineups. 10 The Pennsylvania courts applied the
right to counsel rule to all cases, whether before or after formal
arrest, information or indictment.
50 2
On June 7, 1972, the United States Supreme Court resolved this
problem for federal constitutional purposes. In Kirby v. Illinois,
50 3
the Court held that the right to counsel attaches "at . . .the initia-
tion of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way
of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment .... ,,504 Of course, the due process standard, forbid-
ding any lineup that is "unnecessarily suggestive," is still main-
tained.5
05
Most courts have adopted the Kirby application of Wade, hold-
ing that there is no right to counsel until the prosecution has
been formally initiated.500 Pennsylvania courts, however, have not
reconsidered their earlier position applying the right to counsel
to all lineups. 50 7
It is central to (the constitutional) principle that in addition to
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need
not stand alone against the state at any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might
derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. . . In short, the
accused's inability to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that oc-
curred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity
meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness's courtroom
identification (emphasis added).
,See id. at 254 (dissenting opinion of Justice White, concurred in by
Justices Harlan and Stewart): "The [right to counsel] rule applies to
any lineup ... regardless of when the identification occurs, in time or
place, and whether before or after indictment or information." See, e.g.,
Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Foster, 337 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691,
249 A.2d 482 (1969); People v. Banks, 2 Cal. 3d 127, 465 P.2d 263 (1970).
501. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967): "[T]here
can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical
stage of the prosecution at which he was 'as much entitled to such aid
(of counsel) . . . as at the trial itself.'" See also Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968); United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d
307 (7th Cir. 1967); People v. Palmer, 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969);
State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 291 A.2d 8 (1972).
502. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299
(1971); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Lee, 215 Pa. Super. 240, 257 A.2d 326 (1969).
503. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
504. Id. at 689.
505. Id. at 691.
506. See, e.g., Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Gomes, 464 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1972); State v. Earle, 60 N.J. 550,
292 A.2d 2 (1972).
507. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973)
Wade 505 itself indicates that the right to counsel at a lineup,
like the right to counsel during interrogations,50 9 can be waived
but the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."'
However, the giving of the so-called Miranda warnings is insuffi-
cient. A defendant must be specifically informed not only of his
right to counsel, free if the defendant is indigent, but also of the
right to have his counsel present at the lineup.511
Wade also indicates that "substitute counsel" may be used
where notification and presence of the suspect's own counsel might
result in undue delay.5 12 Thus, a public defender51 3 or an inde-
pendent attorney, not retained or appointed for the suspect,5 14 may
be utilized.
At the lineup, counsel's role is limited.51 5 Unlike an interroga-
(holding Whiting rule applicable but not retroactive); Commonwealth v.
Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 151 n.4, 310 A.2d 366, 367 n.4 (1973).
508. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
509. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (i966).
510. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
511. United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 842 (1970).
512. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). In a footnote,
the Court explained:
Although the right to counsel usually means a right to the suspect's
own counsel, provision for substitute counsel may be justified on
the ground that the substitute counsel's presence may eliminate
the hazards which render the lineup a critical stage for the pres-
ence of the suspect's own counsel.
Id. at 237 n.27.
513. United States v. Queen, 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
514. Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1970); see Zamora v.
Guam, 394 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1968). In fact, one court has permitted
the use of an Assistant District Attorney. See State v. LaCoste, 256 La. 691,
237 So. 2d 871 (1970).
515. In Philadelphia, most defendants at lineups are represented by
the Defender Association of Philadelphia. As a result of a dispute with
the Police Department, the Defender Association refused at one time to
participate in lineups. The District Attorney petitioned the court of com-
mon pleas for an Order directing the Defender Association to furnish counsel
for indigents, in accordance with their contractual obligation with the City
of Philadelphia. In an Order, dated March 10, 1970, D. Donald Jamieson,
President Judge of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, so ordered. In
the accompanying Opinion, In re: Defender Association of Philadelphia,
Judge Jamieson defined the rights of defense counsel:
1. As an observer, he may more objectively than the suspect de-
tect the presence of suggestive influences,
2. [WIithout unduly interfering with the lineup designed to re-
move improper suggestion.
3. [C]ounsel is entitled to knowledge of the information pos-
sessed by the identifying witnesses upon which they propose to
act in making an identification. Counsel, therefore, should be
given an opportunity to interview a witness before a lineup.
4. "[Allowable] questioning by counsel could be reduced to an
absolute minimum if [police] would require that witnesses, be-
fore a lineup, give a description, reduced to writing, signed by
the witness and that a copy thereof be made available to coun-
sel.
5. [S]uch description would indicate . . . the physical character-
istics and clothing worn by the perpetrator . . . , the circum-
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tion, where he can advise his client to exercise his right to remain
silent,516 he may not advise his client that he has a right not to be
in a lineup.51" He is there only as an observer, to witness the fair-
ness or unfairness of the proceedings.5 18 He is there to assure that
there have been neither unfair promptings of the witness nor un-
fair or suggestive arrangements of the participants in the lineup.
519
At least one court has suggested that supplying counsel with prior
descriptions given by the witness would limit the questions he
could ask the witness to inquiries about whether he has been told
that the perpetrator is in the lineup.520 But there is no right to
the names and addresses of the witnesses,5 21 and, in fact, the wit-
ness's identity may be concealed.122 Counsel is free to make rec-
ommendations but may not force the police to accept them. Such
issues should be preserved and can be raised at a suppression hear-
ing challenging the fairness of the lineup.
23
C. Fairness of the Lineup
Whether or not a defendant is entitled to counsel at his line-
up,524 he is always entitle to a fair lineup.5 25  If the lineup is
conducted in a manner that is so unnecessarily or impermissibly
suggestive as to be conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica-
tion, it is invalid.526 Each lineup must be decided on its own facts
stances at the time of the crime under which the observation
was made....
6. Counsel has no right of unlimited questioning.
It would be relevant to ask: Have the police or anyone
else advised the witness that the person who committed the
crime (as distinguished from a suspect) is in the lineup?
7. [T]here would be no relevance in questions . . . such as ...
Has the witness been shown and identified any photographs of
suspects in the lineup? . . . [or] were there previous lineups
which the witness attended, and did the witness identify any-
one in those lineups?
516. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
517. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 493 and 494 supra.
518. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
519. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
520. Opinion In re: Defender Association. See note 515 supra.
521. United States v. Ely, 286 A.2d 239 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
522. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 n.28 (1967).
523. See Note, 29 U. Prrr. L. REy. 65, 75 (1967); Note, 77 YALE L.J.
390, 396-97 (1967).
524. See text at notes 499-507 supra.
525. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967).
526. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). "Un-
necessarily suggestive" is the language of Stovall, id. at 302, while Sim-
and be reviewed from a "totality of the circumstances" to deter-
mine its fairness or unfairness. 527
The initial question is whether the lineup was suggestive.5 28
If it was suggestive, can the procedure be justified by necessity?5 2 9
Even if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, was it nonethe-
less sufficiently reliable 580 to indicate that there was not a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification. 531
In order to assure that the lineup is not suggestive, there
should be a number of similar people in it large enough to require a
real choice by the witness. 532 The police must make sure that the
suspect is not singled out by being dressed differently, or by being
of a different race or size, or by being forced to say or do something
that the others are not.533 Similarly, the police cannot point out a
defendant through the use of repeated lineups or identifications in
which he is the only common participant.5 34 Differentiating one
man would be almost the same as if the police told the witness:
"This is the man!" 5351 Where multiple witnesses are involved, they
should be separated and certainly not allowed to speak to each
other until after the identification. 53 6  Joint identifications are
"fraught with the dangers of suggestiveness.1537 And, of course, the
mons, on photographic identification, quoting Stovall uses the phrase "im-
permissibly suggestive," 390 U.S. at 384. Both have the same meaning.
See United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, 914-15 (2d Cir.
1970).
527. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967); United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1967).
528. Compare Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), with Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
529. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-85 (1968); Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
530. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
531. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 5 (1970); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette,
428 F.2d 912, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1970); Gregory v. United States, 410 F.2d
1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969); State v. Carnegie, 158
Conn. 264, 259 A.2d 628, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 392 (1969); People
v. McMath, 45 Ill. 2d 33, 256 N.E.2d 835 (1970).
532. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Wilson, 450 Pa. 296, 301 A.2d 823 (1973); Henry v. State, 46
Ala. App. 175, 239 So. 2d 318 (1970).
533. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967); United
States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lewis,
472 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1973). People v. Taylor, 24 Mich. App. 321, 180 N.W.2d
195 (1970); People v. Tenizah, 238 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. 1968); State v.
Northrup, 303 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973); Opinion of Judge Jamieson, supra note
515, at 12 n.5.
534. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1909).
535. Id. at 443.
536. See Montiero v. Pichard, 443 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1971); United
States v. Wilson, 435 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Tate v. United States, 268
A.2d 855 (D.C. App. 1970); People v. Noble, 177 N.W.2d 709 (Mich. App.
1970).
537. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967); Gilbert v. Cal-
ifornia, 388 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1967); United States ex rel. Choice v. Bri-
erley, 363 F. Supp. 178, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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police cannot indicate in any way that they have the actual perpe-
trator in the lineup or that one participant is the prime suspect.5 8
To protect the record of such identifications, the police should
accurately note the identity of the participants, take a picture if
possible, and detail what special procedures were undertaken and
what responses were made by the witnesses.53 9
Even a suggestive lineup may not be impermissible. If the ex-
igencies of a situation require a one-to-one confrontation, an iden-
tification so made might be admissible. 40 Similarly, impossibility
of getting a sufficient number of matching participants might indi-
cate necessity. 541 And of course, if a suspect in a lineup engages
in conduct that attracts attention to himself, such conduct is not
impermissibly suggestive state action.
542
An identification derived from an impermissibly suggestive
lineup will ordinarily be excluded as evidence. However, exter-
nal factors indicating reliability may be sufficient to outweigh
suggestiveness and thus allow its admission.5 43 These factors in-
clude the opportunity of the witness to view the crime at the time
of the crime; the witness' degree of attention; the accuracy of prior
descriptions; the level of certainty at the confrontation; and the
length of time between the crime and the lineup.
544
538. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969); United States ex
tel. Barnwell v. Rundle, 337 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Commonwealth
v. Wilson, 450 Pa. 296, 301 A.2d 823 (1973); cf. United States v. Higgins,
458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (indication after identification).
539. State v. Earle, 60 N.J. 550, 292 A.2d 2 (1972). A useful compari-
son of police practices can be made by reference to Directive 58 "Confron-
tations and Standups" of the Philadelphia Police Department April 30, 1970.
In it, the police recommend that there be a "sufficient number of persons"
in the lineup and the recommended minimum is six; that the names and
positions of the participants be recorded; that they be similar in height,
weight, coloration of hair and skin and body type. The directive continues
that there be similarity in dress and that if one member is to wear a
demonstrable piece of clothing or to speak, all do so. Identifications must
be separate and no witnesses may speak to another until all complete their
identification. Finally, it must be assured that "no one indicates to a wit-
ness in any manner which person is the suspect" or that "there is a sus-
pect."
540. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 291 (1967). See text at notes 574-
599 infra.
541. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); State v. Mallette, 267 A.2d
438 (1970); People v. Hughes, 24 Mich. App. 223, 180 N.W.2d 66 (1970).
542. State v. Holsey, 204 Kan. 407, 464 P.2d 12 (1970); People v. Nelson,
40 Ill. 2d 140, 238 N.E.2d 378 (1968).
543. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Gregory v. United States,
410 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969); United States
ex tel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969); See also Stanley
v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex Tel. Choice v. Brierley,
363 F. Supp. 178, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
544. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). These factors are identical
XIII. PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATIONS
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of
the police to show photographs to witnesses or victims in order to
secure an identification. 545 Like any other identification, each
case must be determined on its facts and the standard of exclu-
sion would be whether the photographic identification was so im-
permissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification. 54 , An evaluation must be
made of all the photographs involved to see if the procedure was
"impermissibly suggestive" and if so, whether the picture spread
is likely to give rise to "irreparable misidentification."
547
A. Right to Counsel
Until 1973, there was a conflict among courts as to whether a de-
fendant had the right to have counsel present at a photographic
identification. While most courts held there was no such right,"
48
some held that it was required by Wade.519 In Pennsylvania, the
courts were bound by the Federal Third Circuit rule"' of 1970,
which was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the same
year,55 1 that counsel was required. The Third Circuit overruled it-
self in 1972 and held that a pre-trial photographic identification
by witnesses was not a critical stage requiring the presence of
counsel.5 52 Then on June 21, 1973, the United States Supreme
Court similarly held that the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution did not require counsel at pre-trial photo-
graphic identification. 5 8 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not yet eliminated the counsel requirement in Pennsyl-
vania.
554
with those considered in determining whether an in-court identification is
tainted by an excluded out-of-court one. See United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 240 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); see
text at notes 611-629 infra.
545. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
546. Id. at 384. As noted earlier, supra note 526, "impermissibly sug-
gestive" and "unnecessarily suggestive" have the same meaning.
547. United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1970).
548. United States v. Maxwell, 456 F.2d 1053 (10th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ballard, 423
F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1970); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d
273, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, 481 P.2d 212 (1971); State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175
S.E.2d 583 (1970).
549. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
550. United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Zeiler,
427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970).
551. Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
552. United States v. Coades, 468 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Dorsey, 462 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Reed
v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972).
553. United States v. Ash, U.S. , 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
554. S€e CQmraonwealth v. Claitt, 454 Pa. 304, 308, 311 A.2d 922, 925
(1973).
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Even if counsel is required, under a state's rule, at some iden-
tifications, it is clear that counsel is not required at all photo-
graphic identifications. Thus, in Pennsylvania, counsel would not
be required for a photographic display before defendant is ar-
rested and taken into custody.555 Even if a defendant is in custody,
but is in custody on another offense, counsel is not required.656
The rule requiring counsel at a photographic identification is not
retroactive.
55 7
B. Fairness of Photographic Identification
Irrespective of whether there is a right to counsel at the pho-
tographic identification and whether such right was satisfied, the
procedure used must be fair.558  As with lineups 559 and all other
confrontation procedures, if the totality of the circumstances indi-
cate that the photographic display is impermissibly suggestive, and
thus unreliable as giving rise to a substantial likelihood of mis-
identification, it is inadmissible. °0
In order to assure that the photographic display is not imper-
missibly suggestive, there should be a sufficient number of pic-
tures of different persons. 6 1 The greater the number of photos
shown, the more reliable the identification.562 The photographs
should be as similar as possible as to skin tone, nature of hair,
body build, and face construction.6 3  While there is no require-
(1973) (concurring opinion of Justice Pomeroy); Commonwealth v. Mini-
field, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 154 n.6, 310 A.2d 366, 368 n.6 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973) (holding Whiting non-
retroactive); Commonwealth v. Jackson, Pa. Super. , A.2d (1974)
(Whiting overruled).
555. United States ex rel. Hickman v. New Jersey, 341 F. Supp. 351
(D.N.J. 1972); United States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp.
1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth
v. Smith, 452 Pa- 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973).
556. United States v. Medina, 455 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, Pa. Super. I A.2d (1974) (concurring
opinion of Jacobs, J.); State v. Farrow, 61 N.J. 434, 294 A.2d 873 (1972).
557. United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A-2d 456 (1973).
558. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 440 Pa. 400, 270 A.2d 226 (1970); United States v. Medina,
455 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Dorsey, 402 F.2d 361 (3d
Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973).
559. See text at notes 524-544 supra.
560. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Sinmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968); United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 (5th
Cir. 1970); See Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d
366 (1973).
561. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n.6 (1968).
562. Commonwealth v. Williams, 440 Pa. 400, 270 A.2d 226 (1970);
United States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
aff'd, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972).
563. See United States v. Lee, 459 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
ment that the photographs be of the same portion of the body or
taken at the same session, the display should not be so designed
as to point to the defendant by the nature of his photograph as
compared to the others.56 4  Simultaneous exhibition of photo-
graphs to a group of witnesses is improper. Each witness should
be alone when he views the pictures.5 65 Repeated viewings of a
defendant in several displays can suggest to the witness that "this
must be the man" and might therefore be impermissibly sugges-
tive.56 6 However, the mere fact that a defendant is shown in sev-
eral displays is not necessarily suggestive. It depends on the to-
tality of the circumstances.5 67 Similarly, the fact that a witness
saw a suspect's picture in a newspaper prior to an identifica-
tion in a photographic display is not, of itself, unnecessarily or im-
permissibly suggestive. Again it depends on the "totality of the
circumstances."5 68
The police must give fair instructions to the witness.5 6 9
Thus, they may ask a witness to look at certain pictures but may
not indicate that they believe the perpetrator is among those per-
sons whose photos have been selected. 5 0
Police should keep an accurate record of the display so that
it can be reconstructed.
7'1
Even if a display is impermissibly suggestive, it can still be
reliable enough to show the identity of the perpetrator.
5 7 2  Of
course, if the witness in fact knows the perpetrator and the dis-
play is for discovery of name or other descriptive features, even a
grossly suggestive display is not inadmissible.
573
States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aJf'd,
462 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972).
564. See United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Harrison, 460 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1970).
565. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 (1968); United
States v. Hopkins, 464 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
566. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 (1968); United States
v. Coades, 468 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1972).
567. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (two view-
ings); United States v. Coades, 468 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1972) (four viewings);
United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (two viewings).
568. Dearinger v. United States, 468 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Mini-
field, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973).
569. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 (1968).
570. See United States ex rel. Hickman v. New Jersey, 341 F. Supp.
351 (D.N.J. 1972); United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
aff'd, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972).
571. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 357 Mass. 45, 255 N.E.2d 742 (1970);
United States v. Hamilton, 420 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Thompson v.
State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969).
572. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
573. Commonwealth v. Claitt, 454 Pa. 304, 311 A.2d 922 (1973); see
United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1970).
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XIV. ONE-TO-ONE CONFRONTATIONS
The Supreme Court in Wade and Stovall v. Denno noted that
one-to-one confrontations or "showups" between suspects and wit-
nesses or victims are highly suggestive and thus are looked at
with strong disfavor.5 7 4 Most courts have ruled them inadmissible
as in violation of due process. 57 5 However, as indicated by the
facts of Stovall,576 such a confrontation can sometimes be justified
by necessity, making them not "unnecessarily" or "impermissibly"
suggestive.
77
As most one-to-one confrontations occur prior to the com-
mencement of adversary criminal proceedings, 578 there is no con-
stitutional requirement of counsel at the show-up. 579 And even in
those jurisdictions which require counsel for any identification at
any stage,58 0 proof of "necessity" for the show-up has been consid-
ered sufficient to also eliminate the requirement of counsel.58 ' Of
course, even if a show-up is justified, it must be conducted in the
least prejudicial manner possible.
582
574. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967).
575. See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969); United
States ex rel. Rivera v. McKendrick, 448 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright
v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
576. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), defendant was brought
to the hospital for a one-on-one confrontation. The Court noted that the
need for an immediate hospital confrontation was imperative. The witness
was hospitalized for major surgery to save her life. "Under these circum-
stances, the usual police station lineup . . . was out of the question." Id.
at 302.
577. See United States v. Gomes, 464 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1972); Russell
v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Mackey, 447 Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 778 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa.
Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970).
578. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See notes 494-505 and
accompanying text supra.
579. In Kirby, the defendant was taken to the police station and iden-
tified in a one-on-one situation. The Court held that there was no right
to counsel as "adversary criminal procedures" had not yet commenced.
The Court still left open the question, not necessary for this decision, as
to whether the situation was impermissibly suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification. See also State v. Earle, 60 N.J. 550,
292 A.2d 2 (1972).
580. See Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 735 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973). See
also note 507 and accompanying text supra.
581. See United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1971); Davis
v. State, 13 Md. App. 394, 283 A.2d 432 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217
Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970); see also Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
582. See United States ex rel. Barnwell v. Rundle, 337 F. Supp. 688
273 "
A. Prompt On-The-Scene Identifications
In evaluating the propriety of one-on-one show-ups immedi-
ately after the crime and at the scene, courts have accepted that
strong countervailing policies justify their use. 85 Because of the
timeliness of the confrontation, there is a greater likelihood of re-
call. Because the environment has changed less, there is a greater
probability of reliability. Finally, such immediate confrontations
are essential to achieve the desired goal of expeditious release of
innocent suspects and the quick resumption of the search for the
offender while the trail is still fresh.
58 4
Because these confrontations are suggestive, courts look
closely to determine whether they are (1) prompt; (2) at or near
the scene of the incident; and (3) fair. Too long a delay in the con-
frontation could make the identification obtained thereby inadmis-
sible.5 85 Too distant a locus from the crime scene,58 6 or an ar-
ranged confrontation at the police station 58 7 could also make such
an ientification imzmsibewo uch prompting at the con-
frontation could make it unduly suggestive. 8 8  Again, it depends
on the "totality of the circumstances," as to whether the identifi-
cations, thus secured, are unreliable and thus barred.58 9
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Comonwealth v. Wilson, 450 Pa. 296, 301 A.2d 823
(1973).
583. Spencer v. Turner, 468 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 197,1); 'Davis v. State, 13 Md. App. 394, 283
A.2d 432 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bumpas, 238 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1968);
State v. Townes, 461 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1971); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217
Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 252 (1970); State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 291 A.2d
8 (1972).
584. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State
v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 291 A.2d 8 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217
Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970).
585. Compare McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(four hours later); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Mackey, 447 Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 776 (1972) (one week
later), with United States v. Savage, 470 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1972) (30 minutes
later); United States v. Moore, 459 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (15 minutes
later); Davis v. State, 283 A.2d 432 (Md. 1971) (1 hours later).
586. See United States v. McCoy, 475 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (thir-
teen blocks away); Spencer v. Turner, 468 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1972) (gen-
eral area); United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
587. See United States ex Tel. Barnwell v. Rundle, 337 F. Supp. 688
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); Commonwealth
v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970); cf. State v. Townes, 461
S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1971).
588. See United States ex rel. Barnwell v. Rundle, 337 F. Supp. 688
(E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Coy, 428 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1970); Com-
monwealth v. Mackey, 447 Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 779 (1972); State v. Clarke,
2 Wash. App. 45, 467 P.2d 369 (1970).
589. United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971). As dis-
cussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that
in reviewing the "totality of the circumstances," factors external to the
show-up may be considered to determine if even an impermissibly sugges-
tive identification is still reliable and thus admissible. See notes 543-44
and accompanying text supra. In Neil v. Biggers, although the confron-
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B. Emergency Confrontations
One clear example of necessity is the imminent death of the
victim. 590 Because such out-of-court identifications are admissible
through the testimony of others' courts have recognized that the
emergency need to preserve evidence justifies otherwise imper-
missibly suggestive identification procedures.59 2 However, to allow
such an exception there must be a showing the the witness or vic-
tim is in extremis, or at the very least that his physical condition
prevents him from attending a lineup.598
C. Accidential Confrontations
If a confrontation has been shown to be truly accidental, there
has been no deliberate action by the police justifying application
of the exclusionary rule.59 4 In such a situation, there can be no
tation was seven months after the rape incident, it was found admissible.
The standards used to determine reliability were identical to those consid-
ered applicable to the question of "taint." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972). See also United States ex rel. Choice v. Brierley, 460 F.2d 68 (3d
Cir. 1972). In United States v. Evans, 438 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the
Court allowed an on-the-scene confrontation thirteen days after an assault
and burglary speaking often of the reliability of the identification. More
recently, the fourth circuit in Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 74 (1973) (4th
Cir. 1973), has adapted a two-tiered test of first determining whether
a show-up is impermissibly suggestive and, if it is, deciding if it is never-
theless reliable. Of course, a "reliability standard" would mean
less of an inquiry into the criteria of prompt, on-the-scene, non-prejudicial
confrontations. It seems likely, however, that Pennsylvania courts will
continue to divide their inquiry into whether the out-of-court identification
was impermissibly suggestive and if so, suppress it. Then, they will de-
termine whether the in-court identification was tainted by it. Reliability
will go only to the question of taint. See Commonwealth v. Mackey, 447
Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 778 (1972) (show-up inadmissible; in-court admissible);
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 226 Pa. Super. 50, 311 A.2d 709 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970) (where the out-
of-court identifications were suppressed; on remand to the Honorable Jo-
seph McGlynn, the in-court identifications of the complainant were found
admissible).
590. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); see note 576 supra.
591. See Taylor v. State, 298 A.2d 332 (Del. 1972); State v. Fennell,
7 Ore. App. 256, 489 P.2d 964 (1972).
592. See McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970).
593. See McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Com-
monwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970); see also People
v. Owens, 126 Ill. App. 379, 261 N.E.2d 785 (1970) (hospitalization with
broken leg-confrontation proper). The likelihood that a suspect might
flee is not an "emergency situation." United States v. Coy, 428 F.2d 683
(7th Cir. 1970).
594. See United States v. Furtney, 459 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); cf. United States v.
Venere, 410 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer asks employee to go to
right to counsel as it would require a suspect to be accompanied
by his lawyer every minute. Similarly, as it is a confrontation, the
likelihood of suggestiveness is minimal. Of course, courts care-
fully scrutinize any such confrontations to make sure that they are
not arranged. Intentional confrontations, not complying with the
right to counsel, nor exempt as being prompt and on-the-scene,
would be inadmissible. 9 5
If both the victim and the suspect are injured and taken to
the same hospital, a spontaneous identification is admissible.5 98
Similarly, if the suspect is seen entering or in the hall of the police
station,59 7 or a courtroom,5 98 or on a street, 599 a spontaneous iden-
tification is admissible.
XV. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
The exclusionary rule as to identifications applies to out-of-
court identifications, whether lineups 6 0 0 show-ups 601 or photograph-
ic arrays.60 2 An in-court identification could also be excluded but
only if it was based in any way on the prior out-of-court confron-
tation.6 08
A. No Prior Identifications
There is no requirement that an in-court identification be pre-
ceded by a prior out-of-court confrontation.604 Thus, if a con-
frontation occurs for the first time at a judicial proceeding, rather
than by a police procedure, with the required presence of counsel 0 5
first aid room to see suspect; proper-"Stovall and Wade were concerned
with confrontations arranged by the police. .. .")
595. See United States v. Furtney, 459 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972) (remanded
to see if confrontation unintentional); United States ex rel. Woodward v.
New Jersey, 474 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Coy, 428 F.2d
683 (7th Cir. 1970) (arranged); State v. Clark, 2 Wash. App. 45, 467 P.2d
369 (1970) (arranged).
596. Billenger v. State, 9 Md. App. 628, 267 A.2d 275 (1970).
597. Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283 A.2d 707 (1971).
598. See United States v. Furtney, 459 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972).
599. United States v. Neverson, 463 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Pitts, 450 Pa. 359, 301 A.2d 646 (1973).
600. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967): "Since it appears
that there is grave potential for prejudice . in the pre-tTial lineup . .
(emphasis added).
601. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
602. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); "convic-
tions . . . following a pre-trial identification by photograph will be set
aside . . . if . . . so impermissibly suggestive as to give aim to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." (emphasis added).
603. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
604. United States v. Dorantes, 471 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Hill, 449 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Jennings,
446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971).
605. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (counsel required
where jail possible); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (counsel at
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and the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness,60 6 any
identification made is clearly admissible. 0 1 The fact that it is a
one-on-one confrontation or otherwise very suggestive is irrele-
vant.60 8
Similarly, if a witness or complainant has failed to identify a
defendant at a pre-trial confrontation, a later in-court identifica-
tion can not be based on that and is thus admissible.60 9 The prior
failure to identify is, of course, relevant as to the weight of the in-
court identifications. 610
B. Taint
When an out-of-court identification, whether made during the
course of an improper lineup,6 1 ' photographic identification 12 or
show-up 61 3 is excluded, the court cannot admit the in-court iden-
preliminary hearing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 339 (1963) (counsel
at felony trials).
606. See United States ex rel. Riffert v. Rundle, 464 F.2d 1348 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Hardy, 451 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Isenberg, 343 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Pa. 1972); State v. Ruggiero,
115 N.J. Super. 258, 279 A.2d 128 (1971).
607. See United States v. Dorantes, 471 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1972) (trial);
United States v. Hardy, 451 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1972) (preliminary hearing);
United States v. Hill, 449 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1971) (trial); United States
ex rel. Riffert v. Rundle, 464 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1972) (preliminary hear-
ing); United States v. Isenberg, 343 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (suppres-
sion hearing); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143
(1971).
608. See United States ex rel. Riffert v. Rundle, 464 F.2d 1348 (3d
Cir. 1972) (one-on-one; defendant handcuffed at preliminary hearing);
United States v. Moss, 410 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1969) (one-on-one; defendant
only member of his race present in courtroom); Commonwealth v. Jen-
nings, 446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971).
609. See United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Baker, 220 Pa. Super. 86, 283 A.2d 716 (1971).
610. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 220 Pa. Super. 86, 283 A.2d 716
(1971); see also Adams v. United States, 302 A.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971); Commonwealth v. Minifield,
225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973).
611. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299
(1971). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 450 Pa. 296, 301 A.2d 823
(1973) (taint found).
612. See, e.g., United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Hickman v.
New Jersey, 341 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1972); Commonwealth v. Williams,
440 Pa. 400, 270 A.2d 226 (1970); Commonwealth v. Pennebaker, 224 Pa.
Super. 512, 306 A.2d 921 (1973).
613. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 452 Pa. 521, 307 A.2d 277
(1973); Commonwealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283 A.2d 707 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 226 Pa. Super. 50, 311 A.2d 709 (1973).
tification without first determining that it was not tainted by the
prior illegal confrontation.6 14  The proper inquiry is whether the
in-court identification came as a result of "exploitation" of the im-
permissible confrontation or rather by means sufficiently distin-
guishable as to purge the primary taint.6 15
If a pre-trial identification is inadmissible,616 the burden is on
the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the in-
court identification had an origin independent of the pre-trial con-
frontation.6 17 Again, resolution of the taint issue depends upon
the "totality of the circumstances." 618
One clear indication of lack of taint is that the victim or com-
plainant has seen the perpetrator before and knows him, albeit
not by name.6 19 Other factors are indicated by Wade itself:0
2 0
614. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1968); United States ex
rel. Choice v. Brierley, 460 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Hall,
217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970).
615. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967), citing Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). See Commonwealth v. Futch,
447 Pa. 389, 396, 290 A.2d 417, 420 (1972); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442
Pa. 328, 332, 275 A.2d 299, 302 (1971).
616. One process commonly used to raise the taint issue at a pre-trial
suppression hearing is for the prosecution to call the witness or complain-
ant to the stand to make an in-court identification of the defendant, ignor-
ing prior identifications. The defense may then choose to bring out the
facts of the prior identification to show it was improper and to raise the
issue that the in-court identification was tainted by an improper pre-trial
confrontation. The prosecution would then seek to justify the legality of
the out-of-court procedure or meet its burden that, in any event, the in-
court identification is not a "fruit of the poisonous tree." See A. Davis
and H. Uviller, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Lineup, 4 CnvI.
L. BUL_. 273, 294-95 (1968). Ordinarily the trial court should make sep-
arate findings as to the propriety of the out-of-court identification and as
to taint. Failure to make a finding as to taint, even where the judge
believes the out-of-court identification proper, could lead to reversal or
remand by the appellate court if it disagrees. See Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (reversal); United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d
Cir. 1971) (remand); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d
352 (1970). Inclusion of both findings often leads to affirmance of the
in-court identification by the appellate court, even without consideration
of the out-of-court identification. See United States v. Rabb, 450 F.2d 344 (3d
Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 450 Pa. 359, 301 A_2d 646 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283 A.2d 707 (1971).
617. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967); United States
v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439
Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
618. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, (1967); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 440 Pa. 400, 270 A.2d 226 (1970); Commonwealth v. Minifield,
225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973).
619. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 450 Pa. 359, 301 A.2d 646 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Rankins, 441 Pa. 401, 272 A.2d 886 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 226 Pa. Super. 1, 311 A.2d 694 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pugh,
226 Pa. Super. 50, 311 A.2d 709 (11973).
620. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967):
Application of this test [of taint] . . . requires consideration of
various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the
alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any
pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
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(1) Was there a prior opportunity to observe the defendant
at the time of the criminal act? The longer period a witness
has to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime, the more
likely it is that his in-court identification is based on his recollec-
tion of the individual from the time of the crime.621 Of course,
lighting, distance from the perpetrator, and the nature of the view
are all relevant factors.
62 2
(2) What was the certainty and specificity of the in-court iden-
tification? The more sure a witness is of his identification from the
time of the incident, even under rigorous cross-examination, the
more likely is its independent source.
62 8
(3) What was the prejudicial effect of the excluded confronta-
tion? The more suggestive an out-of-court identification, the more
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify
the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between
the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
consider those facts which despite the absence of counsel, are dis-
closed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
621. United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (1 min-
utes); United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971) (3-6 minutes);
United States ex rel. Choice v. Brierley, 363 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
United States ex rel. Hickman v. New Jersey, 341 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J.
1972) (more than one hour); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285
A.2d 143 (1971) (10 minutes); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328,
275 A.2d 299 (1971) (5-10 minutes); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa.
436, 282 A.2d 693 (1971); Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149,
310 A.2d 366 (1973) (3-4 minutes); Commonwealth v. Foster, 219 Pa. Su-
per. 127, 280 A.2d 602 (1971).
622. United States v. McCoy, 475 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United
States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (full face, no mask); United
States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Randolph,
443 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Airheart, 262 Cal. App. 2d 673,
68 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1968) (lighting); Commonwealth v. Burton, 452 Pa. 521,
307 A.2d 277 (1973) (well lit; inches from the defendant); Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693 (1972) (good lighting, no visual ob-
structions; close proximity); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285
A.2d 143 (1971) (close range; well lit); Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225
Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973) (brightly lit; long and close view);
Commonwealth v. Pennebaker, 224 Pa. Super. 512, 306 A.2d 921 (1973)
(unmasked).
Included within the "nature of the view" are the ability to discern
distinctive physical characteristics on the perpetrator at the time of the
incident and what special ability and training a witness has as to identifi-
cations. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
623. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 450 Pa. 359, 301 A.2d 646 (1973) (spe-
cificity of recollection); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d
299 (1971); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693 (1971)
(positive and unequivocal); Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149,
310 A.2d 366 (1973) (unequivocal); Commonwealth v. Pennebaker, 224 Pa.
Super. 512, 306 A.2d 921 (1973) (positive and unwavering); Common-
wealth v. Jones, 220 Pa. Super. 214, 283 A.2d 707 (1971) (unequivocal).
See also United States v. Harris, 432 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969).
likely it is that it is the basis of the in-court identification. 24 Thus,
if an identification is excluded because of the absence of counsel,
but not otherwise improper, there would ordinarily not be any
taint problem.
625
(4) Were there any discrepancies between descriptions given
to the police and the actual appearance? Substantial and unex-
plained differences could indicate that the in-court testimony was
not based on recollection of the incident but rather on the out-of-
court confrontation. Minor discrepancies, however, would ordinar-
ily not affect admissibility but would be relevant only to weight of
the evidence at trial.
626
(5) Were there any prior identifications? Even if an out-of-
court identification is inadmissible, it is still relevant to the taint
issue. Consistent identification of the defendant by the witness
would be very strong evidence of the certainty of the in-court iden-
tification as being based on the time of the incident.6 27 Of course,
prior -failur to identify, or an identifircainn of a different indi-
vidual, could indicate the unreliability and thus inadmissibility of
the witness's testimony. Such prior failures to identify could some-
times be explained and thus the issue becomes again not admissibil-
ity but weight.
6 28
(6) What was the lapse of time between the criminal act and
the subsequent identification? The longer the delay between event
and identification, the more likely that the later in-court identifi-
cation is based on the more recent confrontation rather than the
earlier incident.
6 29
624. United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (non-sugges-
tive); United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971) (non-suggestive).
625. See United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972) (no
counsel at photographic array); Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super.
149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973) (same).
626. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); cf.
Commonwealth v. Burton, 452 Pa. 521, 307 A.2d 277 (1973) (exact descrip-
tion); United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (no substantial
discrepancies); United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971) (de-
scription close); Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972)
(weight not admissibility); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282
A.2d 693 (1971) (accurate description); Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225
Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973) (minor discrepancies but general con-
formity); Commonwealth v. Pennebaker, 224 Pa. Super. 512, 306 A.2d 921
(1973) (accurate detailed description). See also Massen v. State, 41 Wis.
2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969).
627. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973). See also
United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Randolph, 443 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
628. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 220 Pa. Super. 86, 283 A.2d 716
(1971) (explained).
629. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 452 Pa. 521, 307 A.2d 277 (1973)
(on-the-scene with 5-10 minutes); Commonwealth v. Pennebaker, 224 Pa.
Super. 512, 306 A.2d 921 (short interval); cf. United States v. Higgins,
458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972) (no "undue delay"); Hill v. State, 6 Md. App.
555, 252 A.2d 259 (1969).
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XVI. IDENTIFICATIONS, ARRESTS AND ARRAIGNIVIENTS
Ordinarily, to place a defendant in a lineup, the police must
have consent or probable cause to have arrested him 30 or the de-
fendant must have already been in custody.6 1' However, some
courts have held that "reasonable suspicion' '632 might be sufficient
to allow a defendant to be taken back to the scene for a prompt
confrontation.6 33 If there is illegal detention, it might taint the out-
of-court identification. However such detention for the purposes
of confrontation alone cannot taint the in-court identification, if
such in-court identification has an independent basis.
63 4
Similarly, in a jurisdiction which requires a speedy preliminary
arraignment after arrest, unreasonable delay in that arraignment
might lead to the suppression of any out-of-court identification
which is a product of that delay. But again, the delay does not
automatically oust the in-court identification. The court must de-
termine whether the in-court identification is admissible, as based
on a recollection of the criminal episode, or inadmissible, as tainted




Prior to 1969, each state was free to apply its own constitutional
and statutory provisions as to double and former jeopardy.
636
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,' '63 7 applied only
to cases in the Federal Courts.
6 38
In Pennsylvania, the attachment of jeopardy was limited. The
630. United States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972). See United States ex Tel.
Carter v. Mancusi, 342 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d
1018 (2d Cir. 1972); Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
631. United States v. Jones, 403 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1968); Rigney v.
Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966).
632. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
633. United States v. Moore, 459 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Rodriquez, 459 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1972); Wise v. Murphy, 275
A.2d 203 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
634. Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972).
635. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
636. For a discussion of the various state limitations prior to 1969
see Note, 75 YALE L.J. 262 n.3 (1965); Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272,
1286-88 (1964).
637. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
638. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
State constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy6 39 was limited to
capital cases.640  The only limitations applicable to all criminal
cases were the common law and statutory restrictions precluding
retrial after acquittal or conviction.
4 1
On June 23, 1969, the United States Supreme Court, in Benton
v. Maryland,42 held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution was applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover this Fed-
eral double jeopardy prohibition was later made fully retroac-
tive.643 In addition, on June 6, 1973, the new Pennsylvania Crimes
Code 644 became effective, providing new statutory restrictions on
successive prosecution.
6 45
Unlike the "exclusionary rules" for confessions, searches and
seizures, and identifications, the double jeopardy prohibition does
not merely eliminate the use of evidence, but can completely pre-
clude prosecution of charges, issues, or defendants and can limit
The double jeopardy rules include: the concepts of former
jeopardy, where a defendant has been exposed to possiblity of be-
ing convicted of a criminal offense; 646 the pleas of autrefois acquit
or convict which precludes subsequent prosecution after a determi-
nation has been reached on the merits;6 47 the restrictions on suc-
cessive prosecutions arising out of the same criminal transaction;
48
639. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10: "No person shall for the same offense,
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
640. Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 109-12, 192 A.2d 382, 384-86
(1964).
641. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 464 (1964) provides:
In any plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict, it shall be suf-
ficient for any defendant to state that he has been lawfully con-
victed or acquitted, as the case may be, of the offenses charged in
the indictment.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, § 831 (1964) provides:
If upon trial of any person for any misdemeanor, it shall appear
that the facts given in evidence amount to a felony .... no per-
son tried for such misdemeanor shall be liable afterwards to be
prosecuted for a felony on said facts....
The concepts of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict were common law
principles, applicable in Pennsylvania by the procedures described above.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 514
(1965).
642. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
643. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 n.1 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A.2d 345 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brooks,
454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973).
644. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
645. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, §§ 109-112 (Supp. 1973).
646. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); see notes 651-
700 and accompanying text infra.
647. Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814
(1965). See note 641 supra. See also notes 701-36 and accompanying text
infra.
648. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973),
remanded U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 73 (1973). Included within this restriction
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the restrictions on successive prosecutions in different jurisdictions
for the same criminal events;6 49 and restrictions on mutiple or in-
creased punishment for the same criminal episode.
650
XVIII. FORMER JEOPARDY
If prosecution is terminated prior to verdict, re-prosecution will
be prohibited if the defendant has been so exposed to the pos-
sibility of conviction that jeopardy must be held to attach. 5 1 Gen-
erally, an accused is not in jeopardy until the entire jury, includ-
ing alternates, is impaneled and sworn,6 2 or, in a non-jury case,
until the court has begun to hear evidence.
653
Thus, where a case is dismissed at preliminary hearing, a rear-
rest is allowable.654 Where a defective indictment or information
is dismissed pre-trial, reprosecution is not prohibited.6 55 Similarly
a nolle proseque does not prevent another indictment from being
found for the same offense or the original "nolle prosse" being
opened.656 If a case is dismissed "for want of prosecution," later
prosecution on the same charges is not barred unless there are
is the application of rules of collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436 (1970). See notes 737-62 and accompanying text infra.
649. Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971). See
notes 763-73 and accompanying text infra.
650. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see notes 774-815
and accompanying text infra.
651. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1965); United States
v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
652. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Commonwealth v. Robinson,
317 Pa. 321, 176 A. 908 (1935); Commonwealth v. Curry, 287 Pa. 553
(1926). The new Crimes Code, however, prohibits reprosecution after
"the former prosecution was improperly terminated after the first witness
was sworn." PA. STAT. AN. tit. 18, § 109(4) (Supp. 1973). The Comment
to the Model Penal Code provision 1.09 indicates that it was the intent of
the drafters to change existing law and to have jeopardy attach, even in a
jury trial, only after the first witness is sworn. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.09 (Tentative Draft No. 5 at 56).
653. Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 221 Pa. Super. 472, 293 A.2d 122
(1972). The new Crimes Code once the first witness is sworn. PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 18, § 109(4) (Supp. 1973). See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.09 at 53 (Tentative Draft No. 5 1956) [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.
Comments].
654. Commonwealth ex rel. Riggins v. Superintendent, 438 Pa. 160, 263
A.2d 754 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harbold, 435 Pa. 501, 257 A.2d 553
(1969).
655. See Commonwealth v. Curry, 287 Pa. 553, 135 A. 316 (1926);
see also United States v. Beard, 414 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1969); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
656. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
666 (1942); Commonwealth v. Hart, 427 Pa. 618, 235 A.2d 391 (1967).
circumstances indicating prejudice.65 7
Of course, even where not precluded by the double jeopardy
prohibition, reprosecution may be barred 658 because of speedy trial
restrictions, 59 statutes of limitation,6 0 or other legal doctrines
precluding trial.
661
Whether a second trial is allowable if a trial has been aborted
is a question of fact in each case. The test is whether "taking all
circumstances into consideration" there was "manifest necessity for
the act or the ends of public justice would be defeated."6 6 2 The
policy behind this rule requiring manifest necessity for declaration
of a mistrial is the desire to avoid "[opening] the door for the in-
dulgence of caprice and partiality by the court, to the possible and
probable prejudice of the defendants. ' 663 The ban to reprosecution
is seen as effectuating the policy that a defendant may not be de-
prived of his "valued right to have his trial completed by a par-
ticular tribunal."664 In each and every case, the court considering a
jeopardy allegation must balance the potential harassment of a de-
fendant and his right to a particular tribunal against the ends of
public justice and the propriety of the state's actions.66 5
A. Hung Jury
It is generally held that a dismissal because of inability of the
jury to reach a verdict is based on manifest necessity and thus that
657. United States v. Igoe, 331 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 342 (1965); Masiello v. United States, 304 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
658. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(2) (Supp. 1973) prohibits reprosecu-
tion after a final order or judgment "which necessarily required a determi-
nation inconsistent with a fact or legal proposition that must be established
for conviction of the offense." This provision establishes the principle of
res judicata, for legal bars to prosecution. See Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion, Comments Relating to the Provisions of the Crimes Code at 3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PBA Comments].
659. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 1100.
660. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 108 (Supp. 1973); United States v.
Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Commonwealth v. Cardonick 448 Pa. 322
(1972).
661. Examples of other legal bars are determinations that a defendant
has been pardoned or that he has been granted immunity. M.P.C. Com-
ments at 50.
662. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). See
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1964); United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 403 (1964); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel.
Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859 (1966).
663. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 (1964), citing United
States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cases 499, 500-01 (1869).
664. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973); Commonwealth v. Rich-
bourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A.2d 345 (1971).
665. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Tin-
ney, 473 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1973).
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there is no bar to reprosecution."66 However, the discretion to
grant a mistrial because of a hung hury is not absolute. The judge
must make an inquiry of the panel as to their condition and as
to their division and deadlock. Some questioning must be under-
taken as to their progress in reaching a verdict. 667 Premature dis-
charge of a jury is a violation of the double jeopardy clause.66 8
If there is in fact a deadlock and the court is convinced that continu-
ation of the deliberations would be fruitless or even injurious to
the jurors, discharge, with or without the defendant's consent, is
no bar to reprosecution. 669 Of course, if a defendant specifically
requests a mistrial because of deadlock, there is no bar.670 But
mere acquiescence is not sufficient to justify a premature dismis-
sal.6
71
B. Request By Defendant
Ordinarily, if a defendant requests a mistrial, he cannot later
seek to bar reprosecution under the double jeopardy clause. 72
Even if the defendant's request was prompted by improper prose-
cutorial acts, there is no bar if these acts were not purposeful at-
tempts to cause a mistrial.6 73 However, if the request for the mis-
trial is based on overreaching prosecutorial misconduct, defendant
is being effectively deprived of his right to be tried by an impar-
tially selected jury, and retrial may be barred.6 7 4
C. Sua Sponte Or Request By Prosecution
Under Federal Constitutional law, a judge may, in his discre-
tion, declare a mistrial on his own motion for "manifest neces-
666. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 301 A.2d 876 (1973); M.P.C. Comments at 55.
667. United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Ct., 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.
1973); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 311 A.2d 732 (1973).
668. United States ex tel. Russo v. Superior Ct., 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.
1973); Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964); United
States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972).
669. Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 301 A.2d 876 (1973).
670. United States v. Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972).
671. United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Ct., 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.
1973).
672. M.P.C. Comments at 53; Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91,
288 A.2d 727 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 218 Pa. Super. 88, 272 A.2d
197 (1970); Commonwealth v. Kubachi, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 224 A.2d 80
(1966); see Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
673. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Commonwealth ex rel.
Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859 (1966).
674. See Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 221 Pa. Super. 472, 293 A.2d
122 (1972).
sity.'1675 Similarly, a request by the prosecutor, if found by the
judge to indicate necessity, does not automatically mean jeop-




In the case of mistrials declared by the court sua sponte or the
prosecutor's motion, acquiesence by the defendant or his counsel
is an important element. Where defendant objects, hence express-
ing a desire for a particular tribunal, the discretion of the trial
judge to discharge a jury before verdict is "only to be exercised
in very extraordinary and striking circumstances. 678  In any
event, a careful review must be made of the events leading to the
mistrial and the alternatives available. Prosecutorial misconduct
indicating an attempt to deprive a defendant of a particular tri-
bunal bars reprosecution.6 79 Other prosecutorial actions, possibly
improper but based on legal technicalities or not indicating over-
reaching, do not so bar.
6 0
Certain situations have traditionally been considered to indi-
cate "manifest necessity" so as to justify a mistrial and not bar re-
prosecution.0 8 ' Physical necessity, such as the disappearance,
death or illness of the judge, material witness, or defendant can
justify a mistrial and not bar retrial, even if the mistrial is de-
clared at the prosecutor's or the court's own motion.68 2 However,
alternative remedies must be examined first.8 3 Thus, if a defen-
dant is unavailable, continuances should be allowed to give the
prosecution time to find him. Premature discharge bars retrial.68 4
Similarly, if a witness is ill or unavailable, an inquiry must be
undertaken as to his condition and documentation must be sup-
plied-68 5 Of course, if the illness or unavailability of a witness
was or should have been known before trial by the prosecutor, the
granting of the mistrial over defendant's objection deprives the
defendant of his right to that fact-finder and jeopardy attaches.68 6
675. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684 (1949); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); Common-
wealth v. Wright, 439 Pa. 198, 266 A.2d 651 (1970).
676. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States ex rel.
Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1973).
677. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1964).
678. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); Commonwealth
v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972).
679. Commonwealth v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A.2d 345 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967).
680. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 439 Pa. 198, 266 A.2d 651 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Mont-
gomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
963 (1966).
681. See M.P.C. Comments at 54-55.
682. See United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.
1973); In re Earle, 316 Mich. 295, 25 N.W.2d 202 (1946).
683. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); United States v. Tin-
ney, 473 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1973).
684. United States v. Tinney, 473 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1973).
685. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 285 A.2d 189 (1971).
686. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
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Similarly, if the illness or unavailability is for an easily replace-
able party, such as a juror, who can be replaced by an alternate,
or a prosecutor, who can be replaced by another member of the
staff, a mistrial without the defendant's request or consent is im-
proper.
08 7
Legal necessity may justify a mistrial. Thus, discovery by
the judge that members of the jury were biased for or against one
side warrants discharge and retrial.68 8 Similarly, a military emer-
gency precluding continuation of the trial justifies a mistrial.8 9
In such cases, a careful review must be undertaken to determine
who benefited from the mistrial. A much higher burden is im-
posed if the discharge is not to the defendant's benefit. 90 Thus,
discharge of a jury because witnesses were not properly warned of
their constitutional rights bars retrial.691 Similarly, if a judge
ends a case because of his own personal commitments, 92 or be-
cause he does not wish to resolve certain factual or legal issues,6 98
retrial is barred. Neither discharge benefits the defendant.
While the Federal constitutional standard as to manifest neces-
sity has been broadened recently, the Pennsylvania standard has
been narrowed recently. In Illinois v. Somerville,694 the United
States Supreme Court established a new balancing test for deter-
mining manifest necessity. In weighing a defendant's right to a
particular tribunal against society's interest in insuring that a guilty
defendant does not go free, the Court held that the ends of public
justice are not served by requiring the government to proceed when
a guilty verdict would automatically be reversed by an appellate
court.6 95 Recent decisions of the Pennsylvania courts indicate that
687. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 225 Pa. Super. 247, 309 A-2d 732
(1973); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 218 Pa. Super. 88, 272 A.2d 197 (1970)
(mistrial proper; defendant refused to proceed with jury of less than
twelve).
688. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror acquainted
with defendant); see also Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894)
(juror previously on grand jury that had indicted defendant); United
States ex rel. Peetros v. Rundle, 342 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (jurors
read newspaper articles).
689. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
690. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
691. Id.
692. Commonwealth v. Wideman, 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973).
693. Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 221 Pa. Super. 472, 293 A.2d 122
(1972).
694. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
695. In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), after the jury was
sworn, the prosecutor realized that the indictment was fatally defective.
State law prevented amendment of the indictment. Mistrial, over defense
counsel's objection, was held not to bar retrial.
questions as to the existence of manifest necessity must be resolved
in favor of the defendant. The failure of the prosecutor to recognize
his error prior to trial will bar retrial after discharge of the jury, un-
less the defendant or his counsel requests the dismissal.
6 96 In
fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, applying its own crminal
procedural rules697 once stated that only a defendant or his counsel
may move for a mistrial. Hence a declaration by the court sua
sponte or on request of the prosecution bars retrial.698  However,
this seemingly absolute rule has been limited in later cases 99
and it appears probable that mistrials, with a defendant's consent,





XIX. AUTREFOIS ACQUIT AND AUTREFOIS CONVICT
Under the Federal Constitution 70 ' and Pennsylvania statutes
and common law,702 once an accused has been placed on trial in
a competent court and has been acquitted or convicted, he cannot
ordinarily be placed on trial again for the same offense.
A. Autrefois Acquit
The doctrine of autrefois acquit generally precludes the Com-
monwealth from appealing an acquittal by a competent court or
retrying a defendant on the same indictment. 703 Any indication of
696. Compare Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 285 A.2d 189
(1971) with Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972).
697. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1118(b).
698. Commonwealth v. Lauria, 450 Pa. 72, 297 A.2d 906 (1972) (the
court also found no "manifest necessity" for the mistrial).
699. Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 301 A.2d 876 (1973). (Rule
1118 not applicable to hung jury situation). Commonwealth v. Stewart,
Pa. I A.2d , (1974) (mistrial because of prejudice of jury member
proper even over defendant's objection).
700. See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972)
(discussing "classic examples" of proper mistrials).
701. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
702. Even prior to Benton, the doctrines of autrefois acquit and autre-
fois convict were part of Pennsylvania jurisprudence. See note 641 supra.
The new Pennsylvania Crimes Code bars reprosecution if "the former pros-
ecution resulted in an acquittal" [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(1) (Supp.
1973) ] or if "the former prosecution resulted in a conviction." [PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 109(3) (Supp. 1973)]. The Comments state that this is a
codification of existing law. See PBA Comments at 3.
703. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 676 (1896);
Commonwealth v. Haines, 410 Pa. 601, 190 A.2d 118 (1963); Steinberg v.
Bower, 56 Pa. 408, 27 A. 299 (1893); Commonwealth v. Zeger, 193 Pa.
Super. 498, 165 A.2d 683 (1961).
Under Pennsylvania law, prior to Benton, the Commonwealth could
appeal acquittals in cases of nuisance, forcible entry and detainer and for-
cible detainer and in all other cases where pure questions of law and
no issues of fact are inolved. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1188 (1964).
However, in light of Benton, the courts have found that a "not guilty is
a not guilty" barring appeal on reprosecution after an acquittal, even if
based on questions of law. See Commonwealth v. Rios, 447 Pa. 397, 289
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a finding of not guilty or that there was reasonable doubt as to
guilt invokes the protection.
70 4
The doctrine does not preclude collateral actions against a de-
fendant. Thus an acquittal of a charge will not bar a violation
hearing and a subsequent revocation of probation or parole on the
same facts.70 5 Similarly, an acquittal of smuggling will not bar
forfeiture proceedings against the allegedly smuggled goods.
70 6
Of course, acquittal in a criminal case will not bar a civil suit for
damages.
70 7
Neither does the doctrine preclude the Commonwealth from ap-
pealing from an interlocutory order suppressing or excluding
evidence when the element of finality is inherent in the or-
der.7 8 Any suppression ruling which will "substantially handicap"
the Commonwealth, so that the evidence suppressed may well make
the difference between success and failure, 70 9 may be appealed.
Under ordinary circumstances, the Commonwealth may appeal
from an order sustaining a demurrer. 710 However, if the judge in-
dicates in his ruling that he is, in fact, finding "reasonable doubt,"
it is an acquittal, barring retrial or appeal.7 1' Of course, the Corn-
A.2d 721 (1972); cf. Commonwealth v. Ray, 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410
(1972). In addition, the new Crimes Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109
(1) (Supp. 1973) impliedly supersedes PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1188 (1964)
by providing for an absolute bar upon acquittal.
704. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970) (motion in arrest
of judgment really directed verdict of acquittal); Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (directed verdict of acquittal); Commonwealth
v. Ray, 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972) (ordinance unconstitutional, de-
fendant adjudged "not guilty"); Commonwealth v. Rios, 447 Pa. 397, 289
A.2d 721 (1972); Commonwealth v. Harris, 220 Pa. Super. 102, 283 A.2d
728 (1971) (magic words of "reasonable doubt"). The Crimes Code pro-
vides in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(1) (Supp. 1973): "There is an ac-
quittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier
of fact. .. ."
705. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
706. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
707. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943);
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957). Morch v. Raubitschek, 159 Pa.
559, 28 A. 369 (1894). Of course, the converse is also true.
708. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115 (1966); Com-
monwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 505, 227 A.2d 177 (1965); Commonwealth
v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 212 Pa. Super. 403, 244 A.2d 787 (1968).
709. See Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 505, 227 A.2d 177 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 212 Pa. Super. 403, 405-06, 244 A.2d 787, 788
(1968). For the same principle in federal law, see Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100 (1904) ; Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962) ; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1404, 3731 (1969).
710. Commonwealth v. Mason, 211 Pa. Super. 328, 236 A.2d 548 (1967).
711. Commonwealth v. Harris, 220 Pa. Super. 102, 283 A.2d 728 (1971).
monwealth can only appeal from the demurrer and, if successful




While conviction bars retrial on the same charge,7 13 it has
long been established that the double jeopardy clause does not
preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside
because of an error in the original proceedings. 14 The theory is
that, when a defendant secures a new trial either through post-trial
motions, an appeal, or post-conviction proceedings, he waives the
benefit of the double jeopardy provision. 715 Thus, reversal be-
cause of a defective indictment does not bar retrial on a new and
proper one.716 Similarly, reversal because of improper prosecutor-
ial actions does not bar retrial.
71
C. Implied Acquittal
Included with the concepts of autrefois acquit or convict is the
doctrine of implied or implicit acquittal. If a defendant is brought
712. The new Crimes Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(1) (Supp.
1973) bars reprosecution if there is "a determination that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to warrant a conviction." Because the standard is for a
"conviction," a final order, either unappealed or after appeal, that assuming
all facts in favor of the Commonwealth no reasonable jury could find a de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would bar retrial. In addition
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(2) (Supp. 1973) bars retrial if a prosecution
is "terminated . . . by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which
has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which necessarily required
a determination inconsistent with a fact ... that must be established
for conviction of the offense." The Comments provide that under this sec-
tion any final order would bar subsequent prosecution. See P.B.A. Com-
ments at 3; see also M.P.C. Comments at 49-51.
713. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 464 (1964); Commonwealth v. Bal-
les, 163 Pa. Super. 467, 62 A.2d 91 (1948). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
109(3) (Supp. 1973) (barring reprosecution if "the former prosecution
resulted in a conviction.")
714. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292
A.2d 352 (1972).
The new Crimes Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(3) (Supp. 1973)
limits the double jeopardy bar for convictions which have not been re-
versed or vacated. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 112(3) (Supp. 1973) limits
the bar further to judgments of convictions which were not held invalid
in a subsequent proceeding on a writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or
similar process.
715. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950); United States ex rel. Slebodnik v. Pennsyl-
vania, 343 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa.
42, 292 A.2d 352 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Farrow v. Martin, 387
Pa. 449, 127 A.2d 660 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 986 (1957).
716. United States v. Beard, 414 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1969); see Eubanks
v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
717. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492
(1971).
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to trial on several charges and is acquitted of some and convicted
of others, he may not be retried on those charges of which he was
acquitted, even if he secures a new trial on the charges of which
he was convicted.
718
Similarly, where a crime is included in and forms a neces-
sary part of another, and is but a different degree of the same
crime, a conviction or acquittal of the higher crime will bar prose-
cution for any lesser crime which is an essential element or ingre-
dient.7 19 Thus, if one is convicted of manslaughter or second de-
gree murder, he cannot be tried on retrial for any higher degree
of homicide.720 Similarly, conviction of an attempt to commit an
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the substantive offense it-
self.
7 21
718. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323 (1970) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter; al-
though second conviction for involuntary manslaughter, trial on other
charges improper and new trial ordered); Commonwealth v. Day, 114 Pa.
Super. 511, 174 A. 646 (1934).
719. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 65 (1957); Commonwealth ex
rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 366, 207 A.2d 814 (1965); Commonwealth v.
Thatcher, 364 Pa. 326, 71 A.2d 796 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Maszczyn-
ski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 228 A.2d 30 (1941); Commonwealth v. Cox, 209
Pa. Super. 457 (1967). The rationale is that if the original indictment con-
tained the higher degree, a conviction of the lower degree is in fact an
acquittal of the higher or if the original indictment only contained the
lesser offense, the Commonwealth, having elected to prosecute for the
lesser, is thereafter estopped from prosecuting for the greater. Comment,
19 U. PiTT. L. REV. 630, 643 (1958). The new Crimes Code provides that
"a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater
included offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside. "The
Comments provide this is a codification of existing law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 109(1) (Supp. 1973). P.B.A. Comments at 3. See also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 831 (1964) supra note 641, which provides inter alia that if a
person is tried for a misdemeanor and the same facts amount to a felony,
he may not be later prosecuted for the felony. See Commonwealth v. Arner,
149 Pa. 35, 24 A. 83 (1892).
A troublesome problem occurs with guilty pleas that are later vacated.
Some courts have held that subsequent trial on the higher offense is
barred. Others have held it is not. See Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d
1095 (6th Cir. 1970); Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States ex rel. Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d 233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 94 (1968); United States v. Freije, 282 F. Supp. 997 (D.N.H.
1968); People v. Harper, 32 Mich. App. 73, 188 N.W.2d 254 (1971). The
new Crimes Code does not appear to make any distinctions between
"implied acquittals" for reversals after pleas or verdicts. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 109(1) (Supp. 1973).
720. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 65 (1957); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 387 (1966);
Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 883 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 328 Pa. 439, 196 A. 10 (1938).
721. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450, 70 A.2d 273 (1950);
Commonwealth ex rel. Shaddick v. Ashe, 340 Pa. 286, 17 A.2d 190 (1940).
However, there is an implied acquittal only if one could have
been convicted of the lesser offense within the indictment charging
the greater.
722
Of course, if one is acquitted of the lower degree of a crime,
he is thereby acquitted of all higher degrees as well.7 23
D. Competent Court
The basic requirement for any plea of double jeopardy based on
the doctrine of autrefois acquit or convict is that the defendant has
been tried in a competent court for the same offense.7 2 4  Thus, if
the court hearing the case was not competent, the state may retry
the defendant. For example, where a coroner's jury recommended
a judgment of manslaughter, this did not preclude a trial and con-
viction for murder, as the coroner's jury did not have the power
to decide guilt or innocence.72 5 Similarly, where the court of one
county lacked jurisdiction to try a defendant on a charge, the ac-
auittal in that county is a nullity and retrial is not barred.726
Jeopardy does not attach where the court hearing the case did not
have jurisdiction over the parties or subject 727 or if the original
conviction or acquittal was secured by fraud.
7 2
Under the new Crimes Code,729 the requirement of a trial by a
competent court and without fraud has been preserved. In order
to insure protection to the state, reprosecution is not barred when
there is no jurisdiction7 3 0 or where a former prosecution is pro-
cured by a defendant without notice to the appropriate prosecut-
ing officer.
7 ' 1
722. A. Cortese, Former Jeopardy and the Special Pleas in Bar, 25 TEM-
PLE L.Q. 170, 173 (1951). Thus for example, an acquittal for rape would
bar subsequent prosecution for fornication because under the indictment
for rape, the defendant could have been convicted of fornication. How-
ever, if one engages in robbery, and while in the act of robbery he also
perpetrates arson, the crimes do not merge. 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 505,
506 (1954). See also Commonwealth v. Exler, 61 Pa. Super. 423 (1915)
(murder and statutory rape not merged).
These rules have been changed substantially by the new compulsory
joinder provisions of the new Crimes Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 110 (Supp. 1973). See notes 116-127 and accompanying text supra.
723. Commonwealth v. Thatcher, 364 Pa. 326, 71 A.2d 796 (1950).
724. See M.P.C. Comments at 64; Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333 (1907).
725. Commonwealth ex rel. Wilkes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 113, 222 A.2d
856 (1966).
726. Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972).
727. Johnson v. United States, 41 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 864 (1930); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
728. Commonwealth v. Bolton, 14 Del. 85, (Pa. Q.S. 1915); but cf.
Commonwealth v. Kroekel, 121 Pa. Super. 423, 183 A. 749 (1936).
729. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 112(1), 112(2) (Supp. 1973).
730. The Comments repeat that this is in accord with existing law.
P.B.A. Comments at 4. The Model Penal Code Commentary states that
this is the rule for "all courts." M.P.C. Comments at 64.
731. The Comments state that this "clarifies existing law" as indicated
by the conflict of Bolton and Kroekel (cited in note 727 supra). The re-
Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
E. Subsequent Events
Double jeopardy does not apply to any event subsequent
to the original indictment.732 Thus a prosecution for an offense
which is a continuing one is a bar to subsequent prosecution for the
same offense charged to have been committed at any time previous
to the institution of the first prosecution but is not a bar to a
prosecution for the same offense if committed subsequent to that
time.733 Similarly, if one is indicted, tried and convicted of a crime
involving the injury of another, and the victim later dies, the de-
fendant could be properly indicted and convicted of murder.7 4
While not required by the Federal Constitution, Pennsylvania
law, both by case law735 and statute736 now would nullify a sec-
ond trial if all the acts up to trial time, whether precedent or sub-
sequent to indictment, are not tried together.
XX. SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS OF THE SAME CRIMINAL
TRANSACTION
Prior to the new Crimes Code and recent decisions on criminal
collateral estoppel, successive prosecutions for different crimes
arising out of the same criminal transaction were not barred unless
the offenses "merged"; that is, unless one was an included offense
of the other.73 7 If one were a lesser included offense of the other,
quirement of knowledge to the prosecutor is to assure no fraud and "rests
upon the assumption that the state is adequately protected if the proper
attorney for the prosecution has notice of the proceeding." See M.P.C.
Comments at 65.
732. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 22 Pa. Super. 98 (1903).
733. Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 89 Pa. Super. 272 (1926).
734. Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d
814 (1965); Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 68 A. 184 (1907).
735. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973).
736. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 110(1) (ii) (Supp. 1973). Both the new
Crimes Code provision and Campana are based on the Model Penal Code
provision 1.09. The Commentary indicates the intent of the drafters to
limit reprosecution for any event known and consummated at the time
of the previous prosecution. See M.P.C. Comments at 57.
737. See Commonwealh v. Leib, 76 Pa. Super. 413 (1921); Common-
wealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953). The historic test in
Pennsylvania was "whether the evidence necessary to support the second
indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon
the first. . . ." Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 575, 97 A.2d 343 (1953);
Heickes v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 513, 515 (1856). The first step is to
determine whether a given set of facts gives rise to more than one offense.
If it does, the second offense is separate if the evidence with which the
Commonwealth could secure a first conviction would be insufficient to
secure a separate conviction for the second offense. Commonwealth v.
Shoener, 30 Pa. Super. 321, aff'd, 216 Pa. 71, 61 A. 1093 (1906), affd, 207
U.S. 188 (1907). In other words, if the offenses are distinct and separate, the
reprosecution would be barred under the implied acquittal doc-
trine described above.7s8 Similarly, as there could not be an inva-
sion of the deliberations of the fact-finder, no examination would
be made as to what facts were determined in a prior prosecution,
even an acquittal.7 39 Thus, if different evidentiary questions were
involved, the fact that two or more charges related to and grew out
of one transaction did not give rise to a jeopardy bar.740  Whether
a single act or series of acts constituted two or more separate of-
fenses was determined by whether each offense required proof of
additional facts.
7 4 '
These tests have been changed by the adoption of the Federal
constitutional doctrine of criminal collateral estoppel by the United
States Supreme Court in Asle v. Swenson742 and by the adoption of
the requirements of compulsory joinder by this Commonwealth as
a judicial and statutory principleT43  The "nebulous law of
merger '7 44 is now applicable only to sentencing criteria.
745
A. Criminail CoIla.terai Estonppel
The doctrine of res judicata includes the concept of collateral
estoppel and is now applicable to all criminal cases. If the fact
finder makes a determination of fact necessarily inconsistent with
outcome of a trial of the prosecution of one had no bearing on the sub-
sequent prosecution of the other. See Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa.
570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
738. See notes 718-23 and accompanying text supra.
739. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (successive prosecution
after conviction); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (successive
prosecution after acquittal).
740. Commonwealth ex rel. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 26 A.2d 190
(1942); Commonwealth v. Dunnick, 204 Pa. Super. 58, 202 A.2d 542 (1964).
741. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Gavieres v.
United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911); Commonwealth v. Cox, 209 Pa.
Super. 457, 228 A.2d 30 (1967). Thus if it is alleged that a defendant
has robbed or murdered different individuals in the same transaction, he
may be tried separately for each as each prosecution involved a distinct
fact-the identity of the victim. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958);
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958); Commonwealth v. Melissa, 298
Pa. 63, 148 A. 45 (1929); Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v. Myers, 193 Pa.
Super. 531, 165 A.2d 400 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 860 (1961). Similarly,
a person may be tried separately for the distinct offenses of possession, use
and sale of narcotics. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 387 (1958) or he may
be tried separately for a substantive crime and conspiracy. Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1948); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532
(1947).
742. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
743. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. '18, § 110 (Supp. 1973). In Campana, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court based its decision on "constitutional grounds." The
United States Supreme Court has remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973) for
a determination as to whether it is based on state or federal constitu-
tional grounds. On remand, the court held its decision was based on in-
dependent state grounds. Commonwealth v. Campana, Pa. , A.2d
(1974).
744. See P.B.A. Comments at 3.
745. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 453 Pa. 349, 310 A.2d 88 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275, 305 A.2d 369 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973).
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that required for a second prosecution, the second prosecution is
barred. 746 Whether an issue has been litigated is determined by an
examination of the record to see if a rational jury could have based
its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant now
seeks to foreclose.747 Of course, because only an acquittal would
show a finding beneficial to a defendant, collateral estoppel is not
applicable to successive prosecution after a guilty verdict.148 How-
ever, a conviction of an included offense would bar successive pros-
ecution for a more severe offense, under the implied acquittal and




Although compulsory joinder is not required by the Federal
Constitution,75 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the new
Crimes Code have adopted the Model Penal Code 75 2 requirement
that all known charges against a defendant arising from the same
criminal episode must be tried at one time.75 3 Even if different evi-
dence supports the charges and even if different distinct acts are
involved, if the charges derive from the same criminal event, one
and only one prosecution is permissible.
7 54
746. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
747. Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972) (successive prosecution
for murder and then robbery barred; only issue was whether defendant
was one of the robbers); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971); Simpson
v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971) (successive prosecutions for robbery of store
manager and customer barred; only issue identity of perpetrator); Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (robbery of poker players; acquittal based
on failure to identify defendant; successive trial barred); Commonwealth
v. Dooley 225 Pa. Super. 454, 310 A.2d 690 (1973) (acquittal of arson mur-
der; reprosecution of arson barred); Commonwealth v. De Vaughn, 221
Pa. Super. 410, 292 A.2d 444 (1972) (same-collateral estoppel must be
looked at "realistically").
748. Of course, requirements of compulsory joinder may bar successive
prosecution here. See notes 751-762 and accompanying text infra.
749. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); see also notes 718-
723 and accompanying text supra.
750. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(2) (Supp. 1973) precludes a subse-
quent prosecution if a prior trial was terminated by an acquittal which
"necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must
be established for conviction of the second offense." See M.P.C. Comments
at 58-59.
751. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
752. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See PBA
Comments at 3.
753. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit.,18, § 109 (Supp. 1973).
754. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973).
While there appears to be some confusion as to overlapping
sections of the Crimes Code provision,7 55 it appears that the same
transaction standard is not applicable where an offense is not
known to the appropriate prosecuting officer, 756 where one single
court does not have jurisdiction over all the charges,75' or where the
court orders a separate trial of various charges, 758 or where the
second offense was not consummated at the time of the former
trial.
7 59
Included within the bar to successive prosecution is the former
jeopardy requirement. 60 Thus, prosecution on related offenses
is barred if a previous prosecution was "improperly terminated"
and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense which could have
been tried at the first trial.
761
755. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(1) (ii) (Supp. 1973) precludes a sub-
sequent prosecution for any offense "based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode ... ." A later subsection bars reprosecu-
tion for "the same conduct unless" the prior prosecution (1) involved proof
of different facts and is for a crime intended to prevent a substantially
different harm or evil. Id. at § 110(1) (iii). The dual use of the term
"same conduct" first without exceptions and then with exceptions is obvi-
ously a mistake. It is based on the Crimes Code drafters adopting por-
tions of the Model Penal Code sections on compulsory joinder and on limi-
tations of subsequent prosecutions for different offenses. Compare M.P.C.
§ 1.08 and 1.10 at 29, 55. The Commentary to those sections clarifies the
problem. The second description of the same conduct was devised to
apply only where the compulsory joinder provision did not operate. See
M.P.C. Comments at 57. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304
A.2d 432 (1973), adopting the Model Penal Code provisions, clarifies its
application.
756. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 110(1) (ii), 112(2) (Supp. 1973). This
would include cases where subsequent events occur after trial on the for-
mer prosecution. See notes 732-36 and accompanying text supra. It would
also include events hidden from the prosecutor. See M.P.C. Comments
at 56-57.
757. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 110(1) (ii), 112(i) (Supp. 1973). See
Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972). Dif-
ficult problems arise where more than one court tries criminal cases in
a jurisdiction. Under Campana, if a defendant is tried for a summary
offense before a justice of the peace and acquitted, he may not later be
tried for assault. Protection is afforded by requiring such prosecutions
to be known to the prosecutor. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 112(2) (Supp.
1973). See M.P.C. Comments at 65. Thus, a conviction and fine or acquit-
tal for a traffic violation such as reckless driving, with no prosecutor pres-
ent, and without his knowledge, would not bar trial for the misdemeanor
of driving while intoxicated. Compare Wailer v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1970) (city-state prosecutions and collateral estoppel-double jeopardy
bar).
758. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(1) (ii) (Supp. 1973). A court-or-
dered separate trial must, of course, be based on recognized factors and
considerations. Such an order, over the defendant's objection, might be
later held to have been improper and thus a bar to subsequent prosecu-
tion. See M.P.C. Comments at 39-41.
759. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110. This is similar to the "known to
the appropriate prosecuting officer" provision. See note 756 supra.
760. See notes 651-700 and accompanying text supra.
761. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(3) (Supp. 1973). The Crimes Code
specifically refers to the same standards adopted, barring reprosecution for
same offense in PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 109(4) (Supp. 1973).
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If a defendant appeals a conviction and secures a reversal, the
state is free to try him on all charges arising out of the transac-
tion, unless there has been an implied acquittal of an included
offense.
6 2
XXr. SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS
Under federal constitutional law, it is clear that separate pros-
ecutions in different jurisdictions for the same criminal episode are
proper.763 However, the "dual sovereignty" doctrine does not ex-
tend to permit successive municipal and state prosecutions.
76 4
As a matter of state law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has adopted a prospective rule prohibiting Pennsylvania prosecu-
tion of an offense previously tried in another jurisdiction.70 5 The
only exceptions to the rule permit Pennsylvania prosecution if the
interests of the other jurisdiction were substantially different from
that of Pennsylvania or the interests of the Commonwealth were
not sufficiently protected in the initial prosecution.
6
The new Crimes Code 76 7 adopts this standard by precluding a
subsequent prosecution unless "the law defining each of such of-
fenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or
evil."768 The doctrine of collateral estoppel is also applied by the
Crimes Code. 769 The requirements of compulsory joinder 770 and
former jeopardy 771 are not applied. Of course, such a prior prose-
762. See M.P.C. Comments at 49.
763. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (state, federal);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal, state); Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 193 Pa. Super. 360, 165 A.2d 390 (1960) (federal, state). See
Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909). Shortly after Abbate, the then
Attorney General Rogers indicated that with cooperation between federal
and state authorities, "consideration of a second prosecution should seldom
arise." N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, at 1, col. 4, quoted in L. HALL, Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1213
(3d ed. 1969).
764. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
765. Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971).
766. Id.
767. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Supp. 1973). The Comment
notes: "there is no logical reason why an acquittal or conviction of the
same crime in another jurisdiction should not be as conclusive as within
the same jurisdiction." PBA Comments at 4.
768. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (1) (i) (Supp. 1973).
769. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111(2) (Supp. 1973); See M.P.C. Com-
ments at 63.
770. See M.P.C. Comments at 60. Compare PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18,
§ 110 (Supp. 1973). The section does preclude subsequent prosecution for
the "same conduct."
771. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Supp. 1973) refers to the concepts
of acquittal and conviction included in § 109. No mention is made of "im-
proper termination" found in §§ 109 or 110.
cution had to be known to the prosecuting officer in this Common-
wealth 7 2 and has to be final.
773
XXII. MULTIPLE OR INCREASED PUNISHMENT
The federal constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.
774
After judgment has been rendered and sentence executed, a con-
victed defendant cannot be sentenced on that conviction to another
and different punishment. 775 The multiple or increased punish-
ment prohibition precludes an increase of sentence to correct fac-
tual or legal mistakes7 76 and limits sentence changes after re-
trial.7 77
A. Modification of Sentence
Federal law has long precluded a court from increasing a sen-
tence in any way, once it was executed. 778 However, various states,
including Pennsylvania, had statutes aluwng sentences to be va-
cated, amended, or increased within a set period after imposition.77 9
772. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 112(2) (Supp. 1973). An additional
requirement of a "purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise
be imposed" is found in this provision.
773. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(3), 112(3) (Supp. 1973).
774. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In addition, the
common law doctrine of merger, still applicable in Pennsylvania for the
purposes of sentencing, protects against multiple punishment for crimes
that necessarily involve each other. Commonwealth ex rel. Maszczrynski
v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 21 A.2d 920 (1941). Thus, resisting arrest and assault
and battery on a police officer are proven by the same evidence and they
merge for sentencing purposes. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275,
305 A.2d 369 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Walker, 219 Pa. Super. 167,
280 A.2d 590 (1971) (carrying firearm in car and carrying firearm on per-
son). But robbery and murder do not merge and separate concurrent sen-
tences for each after a felony-murder conviction is lawful. Commonwealth
v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A.2d 456 (1973). Clearly, separate murders in
the same incident may be punished separately. Commonwealth v. Hill,
453 Pa. 349, 310 A.2d 88 (1973).
775. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
776. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 219 Pa. Super. 22, 280 A.2d 651 (1971).
777. Odom v. United States, 400 U.S. 23 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Gaito, 223 Pa. Super. 564, 302 A.2d 390 (1973).
778. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); United States v. Mur-
ray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873);
United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); Tatum v. United
States, 310 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Some argued that the federal doc-
trine was based on the lack of jurisdiction and statutory power to increase
sentence. See Acme Poultry Corp. v. United States, 146 F.2d 738, 739
(4th Cir. 1944).
779. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1032 (1969). There could be no claim
that Pennsylvania courts, given authority specifically by statute, did not
have the power or jurisdiction to increase sentence. See United States
ex rel. Jones v. Pennsylvania, 218 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Common-
wealth ex rel. Gaynor v. Maroney, 199 Pa. Super. 81, 184 A.2d 409 (1962).
The only requirement might have been that if a second harsher sentence
was imposed, adequate reasons had to be apparent on the record. United
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In addition, some states had provisions allowing sentencing panels
or appellate courts to review and, if desired, increase sentences.
7 80
Despite the fact that other courts have held such proceedings not to
be in violation of the double jeopardy clause,8 " the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional
and has prohibited any modification of a sentence that can be con-
sidered an increase of punishment.78 2 The rule is retroactive.
78 3
This restriction on increase of sentence has been applied strict-
ly. Clearly, even if later acts merit an increased sentence, no in-
crease in punishment may be imposed.78 4 In addition, sentencing
on any one charge cannot be increased, even if the overall "punish-
ment" for all the charges in a transaction is reduced.78 5 A judge
may not correct upwards an illegal sentence,7 86 or correct up-
wards an improperly recorded sentence so as to conform with a
judge's true intentions.
787
Probation is a sentence and cannot be increased or changed to
a prison term unless there has been a probation violation.7 8 Once
there is a violation, however, a new prison sentence may be im-
posed up to the maximum allowable at the time of original sentenc-
ing. 8 9 Of course, a suspended sentence, unlike a probationary sen-
tence, cannot be changed.
790
States ex rel. Wirtz v. Rundle, 281 F. Supp. 85, 89 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See
Commonwealth ex rel. Billman v. Burke, 74 F. Supp. 846, 848 (E.D. Pa.
1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1948).
780. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194 to 51-197 (1965); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 278, §§ 28 A-D (1965).
781. See, e.g., Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972).
782. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971).
Of course, a sentence can still be decreased within the thirty day period.
See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
783. Commonwealth v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A.2d 345 (1971).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 220 Pa. Super. 395, 281 A.2d 740
(1971).
784. Commonwealth v. Scrivens, 448 Pa. 60, 292 A.2d 313 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Lemley, 218 Pa. Super. 350, 280 A.2d 429 (1971).
785. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 219 Pa. Super. 107, 280 A.2d 592 (1971).
786. Commonwealth v. Young, 223 Pa. Super. 447, 302 A.2d 402 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Hermankevich, 220 Pa. Super. 197, 286 A.2d 644 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa..Super. 357, 280 A.2d 422 (1971).
787. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 220 Pa. Super. 395, 281 A.2d 740
(1971); Commonwealth v. Phelps, 219 Pa. Super. 107, 280 A.2d 592 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 219 Pa. Super. 22, 280 A.2d 651 (1971).
788. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa. Super. 357, 280 A.2d 422
(1971); In re Moore, 217 Pa. Super. 206, 269 A.2d 395 (1970).
789. Commonwealth v. Cole, 222 Pa. Super. 229, 294 A.2d 824 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 222 Pa. Super. 233, 294 A.2d 778 (1972).
790. Commonwealth v. Davy, 218 Pa. Super. 355, 280 A.2d 407 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Young, 223 Pa. Super. 447, 302 A.2d 402 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Phelps, 219 Pa. Super. 107, 280 A.2d 592 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Thomas, 219 Pa. Super. 22, 280 A.2d 651 (1971).
Changing the nature of a sentence is improper, if the effect of
the change is to increase the sentence. Thus, where a fine or resti-
tution is improperly imposed, no new jail sentence can be imposed
and only the illegal condition or type of sentence can be stricken or
modified.7 9 ' Similarly, changing a sentencing from concurrent to
consecutive is a prohibited increase.7 92 Thus, as sentences at the
same time are presumed to be concurrent, unless otherwise stated,
a later declaration that they are consecutive is in violation of the
double jeopardy clause.
793
B. Increase On Appeal
There is no double jeopardy bar to imposing whatever sentence
the law allows for the offense upon reconviction after appeal.79 4
However, as there is a potentially chilling effect on the right of
appeal if a defendant is in danger of receiving a higher sentence,
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
a higher sentence must appear on the record and be based on
"objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentenc-
ing."7 95 Merely stating that the judge disapproved of a defendant's
"manner and demeanor and conduct prior to and during the trial"
is insufficient. T9 6 Conduct occurring prior to original sentence,
even if not finalized then, is insufficient.797 Objective acts, such as
an escape attempt or an assault, are sufficient.798
If no such identifiable conduct is existent or noted, sentence
may not be increased on any of the charges.7 99 Even if the over-
all punishment for a criminal incident is lowerd or kept the same,
an increased sentence on any charge is impermissible 00
The Pennsylvania rule is stricter than the Federal requirements.
While not required by the Constitution,8 ' resentencing in Penn-
791. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa. Super. 357, 280 A.2d
422 (1971).
792. Commonwealth v. Hermankevich, 220 Pa. Super. 197, 286 A.2d 644
(1971).
793. Commonwealth v. Pristas, 222 Pa. Super. 254, 295 A.2d 114 (1972).
794. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
795. Odom v. United States, 400 U.S. 23 (1970); Moon v. Maryland,
398 U.S. 319 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Com-
monwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971).
796. Commonwealth v. Gaito, 223 Pa. Super. 564, 302 A.2d 390 (1973).
797. Commonwealth v. Werner, 444 Pa. 458, 282 A.2d 258 (1971).
798. Commonwealth v. Sinwell, 223 Pa. Super. 544, 302 A.2d 400
(1973).
799. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971).
800. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 450 Pa. 467, 303 A.2d 481 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971).
801. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
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sylvania after a retrial pursuant to a vacated guilty plea must com-
ply with the "identifiable conduct after first sentence" standard.
80 2
Again, even though retroactivity is not required by the Consitu-
tion,103 the due process requirements for increased sentencing upon
reconviction have been made retroactive in Pennsylvania, so as to
require the present filing of reasons and then a review.
80 4
A more difficult problem arises in cases where a trial de novo
is sought after conviction in Municipal Court or from a summary
proceeding before a justice of the peace. In 1971, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held80 5 that, to preserve the right to appeal, no in-
crease in sentence would be allowed on a trial de novo unless rea-
sons relating to identifiable conduct after the lower court sentenc-
ing appear on the record. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court
held that this standard is not a constitutional requisite to trials de
novo as the slate is wiped clean and the new trial represents a
completely fresh determination of the facts.80 6 Similarly, Pennsyl-
vania courts have recently held that "identifiable reasons" are no
longer required for sentences on trial de novo.80
Whether or not an increased sentence is given after retrial, full
credit must be given for time previously served on the offense.808
C. Collateral Sentencing Consequences
Certain sentencing procedures clearly do not violate the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. For example, revocation of probation or pa-
role after a technical violation or a new offense and sentencing
a defendant to prison for the remainder of his original sen-
802. Commonwealth v. Moore, 225 Pa. Super. 264, 302 A.2d 396 (1973).
803. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
804. Commonwealth v. Allen, 442 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971).
805. Commonwealth v. Harper, 219 Pa. Super. 100, 280 A.2d 637 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Mirra. 220 Pa. Super. 393, 281 A.2d 733 (1971).
806. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
807. Commonwealth v. Moore and Battle, 226 Pa. Super. 56, 312 A.2d
422 (1973). One judge suggested in a separate concurrence, Id. at 65, 312
A.2d at 425, that to avoid the threat of vindictive sentencing on retrial, the
sentence should not be revealed to the common pleas court judge unless the
defendant or his counsel specifically asks that it be revealed. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has not yet ruled. Compare Cherry v. State,
9 Md. App. 416, 264 A.2d 887 (1970); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276
A.2d 137 (1971) (Pearce applicable as a matter of state public policy).
A similar inquiry involves jury resentencing. Since the slate is clean, in-
creased sentencing is constitutionally permissible without affirmative rea-
sons on the record. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
Except for imposition of the death penalty on a charge of first degree mur-
der, there are no offenses for which sentence is imposed by the jury.
808. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
tence or for a period longer than the original term is not a viola-
tion of the double jeopardy clause. 0 9 This is true even if trial of
the offense upon which a revocation is based resulted in an acquit-
tal.810 Of course, an order placing a defendant on probation con-
stitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.8"' Thus a
court may not increase a term of probation, without a revocation,
but may modify the order or state a new sentence if the terms
thereof are violated or conditions are not met.
8 12
Sentencing a recidivist more harshly than a first offender is
not viewed as an additional penalty for earlier crimes, but rather
as a penalty for the most recent offense which is aggravated be-
cause it is repetitive. 81  Of course, such multiple or habitual
offender sentencing must be done at the time of sentence impo-
sition . 14  Statutes which allow recidivist resentencing any time
after conviction of the new offense would be held to be unconstitu-
tional.815
809. Commonwealth v. Cole, 222 Pa. Super. 229, 297 A.2d 824 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 222 Pa. Super. 233, 294 A.2d 778 (1972).
810. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
811. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 200, 231 A.2d 301 (1967).
812. Commonwealth v. Mirra, 220 Pa. Super. 393, 281 A.2d 773 (1971);
United States ex rel. Vivian v. Bookbinder, 286 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa.),
afr'd, 403 F.2d 156 (1968).
813. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
814. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act, Act of June 3, 1971,
P.L.-, No. 6, § 1, [1971] (repealed 1973) (two years after final sentence
to impose recidivist penalty).
815. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-09 (1931); Ex parte
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